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PREFACE 
Mr. Ben-Tahir has asked me to comment, as a preface, on his thesis 
topic. 
When he first proposed the subject area, it struck me as an extremely 
interesting but difficult one. If Ben-Tahir's perception of the widespread 
occurrence of the decay· phenomenon were correct, it would necessarily involve 
an extremely broad survey to confirm it. As he remarks, this was indeed the 
case, and a major difficulty was to whittle the project down to reasonable 
size. 
A second problem was to bridge the gap between the colloquial sense of 
"information" (meaning, knOll/ledge, etc.), which we all know, and any techni-
cally precise sense which could be rigorously studied. In the former sense, 
\1/e all realize that technology, war, and indeed all human pursuits involve 
"information." The latter sense has traditionally been restricted to the 
field of documentation, or else to the statistical "information theory" of 
Shannon, Hartley, and others. It seems to me that the parallels Ben-Tahir 
explores suggest that the connections are rich and potentially fruitful. 
I have greatly enjoyed the challenge of exploring his ideas with 
Mr. Ben-Tahir, and hope that they will be a continuing stimulus to him and 
others. 
xxi 
ABSTRACT 
Information decays with respect to time (and 
its variables) in a technological environment. 
This may be measured quantitatively in terms of 
"half-life". This provides a new perspective from 
which to view the impact of technology on society, 
and of technological innovations on strategic 
thinking, or war. The diminishing value of 
information (rate of decay) in the military 
environment affects instant decision-making based 
on highly ephemeral (rapidly perishing) battlefield 
information; and long-range decision-making for the 
slowly decaying systems affected by a 
threat-counterthreat cycle since 1945. The 
macro-information systems (civilizations and 
countries) also experience decay of their relative 
power or their effectiveness to wage wars (in the 
1980s and beyond). This information syndrome can 
be utilized to avert large-scale or total war. 
1 
While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, 
and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day 
and night shall not cease. 
Genesis VIII:22 
The Torah 
And the women were given two wings of a great 
eagle, that she might fly into the wilderness, into· 
her place, where she is nourished for a time, and 
times, and half a time, from the face of the 
serpent. 
Revelations XII:14 
The Bible 
And We caused Jesus, son of Mary, to follow in 
their footsteps, confirming that which was 
(revealed) before him, and We bestowed on him the 
Gospel wherein is guidance and a light, confirming 
that which was (revealed) before it in the Torah --
a guidance and an admonition unto those who ward 
off (evil) .1 
The Quran V:46 
1. Translation by Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, my 
father's professor and mentor (1933-34) who 
taught him to be an officer and a gentleman. 
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1. A SPACE IN TIME 
All animate and inanimate genera in the universe have a certain 
life: are born, develop or grow, and die. We observe this phenomenon 
every day for various species of many of the genera from the elementary 
protozoam to a star. 
The life of a star is a very interesting phenomenon. Since the 
advent of extremely large telescopes and radio-astronomy, man has been 
able to observe stars, whose species range from their genesis to their 
necrosis. In between the two extremes: the birth and the death, lies a 
spectrum of phases in the life of a star. Each star rises to its 
prominence, illuminates the universe around itself, like our sun, 
reaches its epitome and then gradually begins its slow decline and 
eventual demise. The epitome or the climax, regardless of the time it 
is reached in the span of the star's life is called the 'half-life' 
of the star, which does not necessarily mean half of the time it has 
left in its life, but half of the energy it has expended or has in 
storage to spend in future. 
The classic definition of half-life is the time required for the 
activity of a given radioactive species to decrease to half of its 
initial value due to radioactive decay and is independent of the amount 
or condition oi that species. 
We have enormous amounts of information on the lives and 
half-lives of the stars and other radioactive and chemical material, 
and this information is growing all the time. However, we do not have 
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any information on the information itself, i.e., whether the items of 
information have any life themselves. 
Information is any knowledge gained through communication, 
research, instruction, observation, etc., and information science is 
the study of the characteristics of information and how it is 
transferred. It is concerned with creation, collection, organization, 
storage and analysis of information in the process of decision-
making (6). 
In physical sciences there is an empirical ordering of 
quantities, 
knowledge 
but information science is relatively a new field of 
which is interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary. 
Information science being multidisciplinary extracts elements from many 
of the "hard" and "soft" sciences. It is the rationale, the logic and 
is the intellectual parent of computer and library science, but has 
arrived, if the theory of relativity could be applied in this instance, 
only after the birth of its offsprings. 
Our quest is to determine if information does have (not that is 
should or "ought" have) a life: genesis, growth and decay; and if this 
decay phenomenon plays any part in the process of decision-making, 
especially at the point where information is at its optimum value or 
half-life. 
Since there is no empirical quantitative ordering of 
information, half-life can be defined as: 
1. the time (actual or expected) within which half the total use 
of information has been or expected to be made; or 
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2. the time when 50 per cent of the information is utilized; or 
3. the time at which half of the information has depreciated or 
perished. 
We shall also try and examine if the embodiment of science, i.e., 
technology and its functional use in strategy or war can be viewed in 
the frame of this "half-life syndrome". 
Chapter 2 is a review of the classical themes in the philosophy 
of technology and we shall see if technology has any relationship to 
information and the rate at which technology changes or depreciates. 
In Chapter 3, we shall discuss the effects of technological 
embodiment of science on strategy or war and the dialectic 
relationship, if any, existing between these elements and if either of 
them ·have any synonymy with information. 
Chapter 4 is the development of the hypothesis of half-life 
syndrome in information by synthesizing various approaches by 
information scientists from the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia and 
determine if a threshold or a discard point for information exists. 
In Chapter 5 we examine conflict as an information system. The 
prescription for both intra- and international war and the ingredients 
and actors who contribute to the formulae of conflict. 
Chapter 6 synergizes all the previous chapters; and we shall 
determine if the models of information decay developed in Chapters 4 
and 5 fit real situations, such as, a rapidly perishing technological 
battlefield or a slowly developing revolutionary process which 
could/would have a devastating effect on Western civilization 
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as we know it at present. 
Chapter 7 is a summary of the thesis as well as a statement of 
whether we have been able to establish the fact that information 
science is inter- and multidisciplinary and whether we are able to 
conclude and meet the objectives we have stated here. 
6 
2 • TECHNOLOGY: RUN OF THE MILL l 
Flight into Realism 
(A Science-fiction Sonnet) 
I swam ten trillion miles across the sea 
To the shoal and ebb of an alien isle 
Of murky myth and miry mystery. 
And there I stood astill, in daze a while, 
Drenched of mortal id, and doused of psyche. 
Upon her hushed shores I knelt to admire, 
The serene beauty of perpetuity, 
Of aeons past, of ageless pyric dire, 
Which made me feel and brush eternity 
That void like some dark inhuman womb 
Restored my lost sense of reality; 
And when I returned to this worldly tomb 
I craved my anguished mind to relate 
But I am compelled to a spellbound fate. 
I. Ben-Tahir 
In "Refractions 69". 
1. An abridgement of the partial requirement for special 
topics course CIS 492a: Contemporary Metatechnology taken 
under Professor S.L. Goldman, B.S., M.A., Ph.D, Andrew W. 
Mellon distinguished professor in the humanities and 
director, Humanities Perspectives on Technology program, 
Lehigh University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aerospace technology is the fas teat changing technology in 
the 1980s. Since aircraft and other aerospace vehicles (spacecraft, 
rockets, missiles, etc.) are heavier-than-air, considerable effort is 
expended on research and development (R&D) in discovering lighter and 
more durable metals and alloys to meet both the lightness and stress 
criteria. The science which is closely associated with this (R&D) is 
metallurgy. Studies of usage of information generated in the field of 
metallurgy indicate it as having a relatively short half-life of 
approximately 3.7 and 3.9 years (25,71,101). Since technolog~ being a 
pragmatic discipline, consumes information faster than science can 
produce it, Redmond (104) estimates the figure of half-life for 
aerospace technology at 2.5 years (which is borne out by fast turn-over 
and obsolescence of various aerospace programs such as the 
cancellations of the supersonic transport (SST) by the US Senate in 
1971 and the B-1 bomber by Mr. Carter in 1976). 
The ephemerality of information of aerospace technology is no 
more emphatically illustrated than in the operational role of the 
fighter aircraft. In the 1960s the US-built F-104 Starfighter2 was 
generally conceded as the most advanced fighter in the world (4). In 
the India-Pakistan war of 1965 this aircraft proved the technological 
2. In Canada the aircraft is designated CF104 and was manufactured 
under license by Canadair Limited as CL-90 (12). 
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superiority of the Pakistan Air Force against a numerically superior 
Indian Air Force. However, in the 1971 India-Pakistan affray, which 
brought about the emergence of a new nation, Bangladesh, almost the 
entire fleet of F-104 Starfighters was lost to a technologically 
superior Soviet manufactured MiG-213 aircraft and surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM). 
Wars since 1945 between the Third World nations have in part 
been wars by proxy for the superpowers. These wars have also served as 
laboratories for active or destructive testing of the superpower 
arsenals. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated (9): 
1. the attrition rate of armament in a modern technological 
battlefield is faster than the efforts of the superpowers to 
replace the losses by conventional means; and, 
2. the F-4 Phantom tactical strike fighter, the mainstay of the 
Israeli Air Force and which had been tried and tested in the 
Southeast Asian theatre by the US, was no match for the 
MiG-21B and MiG-21J4 air-to-air fighters which operated in 
the 30-40,000 ft. envelope and at 0. 6 to 1. 6 Mach numbers 5. 
The latter factor jolted the US tactical planners into a 
recognition of a need for a lightweight fighter to meet the critical 
3. NATO code name for MiG-21 is Fishbed (53). 
4. MiG-21B and -J are versions of the same aircraft involved in 
different operational roles (53). 
5. Mach number represents the ratio of the speed of aircraft to the 
speed of sound in the surrounding atmosphere. It becomes constant 
at 36,089 ft. altitude and above (100). 
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air combat manoeuvre (ACM) performance (dogfight) in battle so as to 
maintain air superiority for the West and its allies. Thus began the 
technological race for a fighter aircraft to replace the F-4 Phantom, 
which culminated in the development and manufacture of F-16 and YF-17 
(F-18A and F-18L) fighter aircraft (9,46). 
The rate of change in technology, specifically in the 
aerospace-defence environment illustrates certain effects on the 
subjects directly involved in its use. For instance, recent studies at 
the United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine (USAFSAM) has 
shown that loss of consciousness (LOC) can be induced in aircrews when 
their "g"6 tolerance is exceeded even with additional protective 
devices such as anti-g suits, straining manoeuvres and tilt-back 
seats. This is true of most of the advanced air superiority fighters, 
including the F-15 Eagle7, which has a high g onset rate of up to 
lOg/sec (129). 
These levels of increased g forces applied on aviators in 
modern high performance fighter aircraft are no longer 
airframe limited but instead are limited to the ability of 
the human body to withstand the excess g forces. Acutely, 
the g-limiting symptoms constitute a spectrum of 
decreasing sensorium ranging from grey-out through 
black-out to a final loss of consciousness. The threshold 
for the onset of grey-out, black-out and LOC are variable 
and are influenced by the rate of onset of g, duration of 
g, previous g experience, heart rate and blood pressure 
along with other associated factors (129). 
The most important findings at USAFSAM was that several of the 
aircrews did not believe that they had undergone LOC until instant 
6. "g": force exerted on a body at rest by gravity when subjected to 
acceleration. 
7. The technological standard bearer (fighter) for the Western air 
forces in the early 1980s. 
10 
replay review of the videotape recordings. Consequently, it is 
possible for a pilot of a high performance aircraft such as F-14, F-15, 
F-16, F-18, etc., who loses consciousness to be unaware that anything 
had occurred. Subsequent failure to report such an unwitnessed event 
is quite possible as no significant residual symptoms other than 
transient amnesia and confusion were manifest in any of the subjects 
(129). 
Another example is a study by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 
Britain. A certain period after RAF issued anti-g helmet as a standard 
equipment to the aircrew to alleviate the problem of restraints in the 
head movements during high g turns, new shirts with larger neck sizes 
had to be ordered for the build up of heavier neck muscles due to (93): 
1. the distribution or the shift of the g force from the head to 
the neck; and, 
2. the weight of the helmet. 
The above examples from USAF and RAF cite the physiological 
manifestation of technological change; however, these are minimal when 
compared to the social and psychological effects of technology which 
are remarked on by different schools of theorists and philosophers of 
technology. 
THEORISTS' APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
There are several schools of thought on the nature of technology 
and its impact on mankind. As a whole these theorists discern the 
effects of technology with views ranging from dispassionate observation 
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through passionate support. Their individual approaches to the effects 
of technology on man and society depend immensely on the theorist's own 
background, viz., education, experience, orientation, outlook, etc. 
Most of the theoretical views of the effects of technology on 
society can be classified under four major approaches. 
1. The Utopian approach is a universalist or utilitarian one 
which accepts technology as the panacea for all worldly ills 
and promises utopia in our time. 
that: 
The doctrine professes 
a. technology is intrinsically good and should be 
pursued for its own sake (82); 
b. technology has made the physical facts of our lives 
much more tolerable, with such innovations as computers 
providing opportunities to organize and enrich our lives, 
and society should adapt to the time of great change (88); 
c. global wealth varies directly with technology in the 
process of extricating products and energy; moreover, 
politicians are a hurdle to progress as they do not 
understand the "metaphysical mastering of the physical" 
(74); and, 
d. most of the negative comments 
deliberately created myths to 
pressing problems (44). 
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against technology are 
divert attention from 
These optimist utopian views are generally held by US 
thinkers, (e.g., Mesthene, Morison, Fuller, Ferkiss), who are 
conditioned by the American manifest destiny theme. 
2. The Relativist group of theorists emphasize environment, time 
and space, and they visualize technology as a medium through 
which time and society are passing. They tend to place time 
within history rather than the reverse, and see history 
through form. They are fascinated by the ebb and flow of 
information systems (74). 
This relativist view is held generally by Canadian thinkers, 
Innis and McLuhan (74). 
3. The Determinist approach is rather a broad spectrum of views 
ranging from guarded pessimism to apocalyptic fatalism. It 
elaborates the darkest aspects of technology with all its 
gargantuan horrors. 
This view is mostly held by European thinkers(74): Giedion 
(Switzerland), Toynbee (Great Britain), Berdyaev (Russia) and 
Ellul (France). Certain American theorists: Mumford, 
Weizenbaum (128) and Wiener (127), who once believed in the 
great promise of technology have drastically shifted their 
position sometimes matching the fatalism of Ellul, whose 
"technique" is a near-diabolic life-force which man is 
helpless to curb or stop. A disaster so enormous awaits man, 
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he envisions, that blame is a pointless luxury (74). Ellul 
(41) and Berdyaev (14) are fatalists. Ellul sees himself as 
diagnosing an ailment and not making judgments. His 
"technique" transcends the machine: a boundless, limitless, 
metaphysical force that politics, economics, morality, 
spiritual values find themselves immersed in; it is "the 
religion, the ideology and the central force of our society" 
(41). However, Berdyaev's "technique" is the personification 
of anti-christ (14). 
4. The Ideational approach is expounded by Sorokin, an 
expatriate-Russian American, who sees the crisis in our time 
as that of deviation from "ideational" or spiritual values 
revealed to us by God in opposition to the "sensate" truth 
revealed by our secular empirical experience or senses. A 
synthesis of the ideational and sensate truths reached 
through by our reason, viz., mathematics, syllogisms, etc., 
he stated is the idealistic truth (114). 
Sorokin saw degeneration in the Western culture's music, 
literature, art, sculpture, architecture, 
religion and personal relationships as 
the sensate relativistic ethics, i.e., 
jurisprudence, 
the effect of 
utilitarianism, 
hedonism and pragmatism, and relates them to the bankruptcy 
of the technological values and everything associated with 
this arcane anathema. He proposes the remedy as the return 
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to the ideational values of faith and truth revealed by God 
as the sole salvation for the Hestern civilization ( 114). 
Sorokin, like Innis, sees the sensate culture through form 
(74,114) with paintings, sculpture, music, literature, etc., 
depicting the subsocial stratum of prostitutes, criminals and 
nudity as the heroes of the time. 
The values of the sensate culture Sorokin claims, are 
utilitarian: "If belief in God is useful, God exists; if 
not, he does not ...... The motto of the sensate value system, 
everything is relative (114), is echoed by Weizenbaum's 
criticism of his fellow scientists who believe, "what science 
has not done, it has not ~ done" ( 128). 
The above are the four major approaches of the theorists on the 
effects of technology on society. There are certain other minor views 
which are value-free (Wertfrei) and are orientated only towards the 
understanding of certain technological systems. Anders, Jonas, JUnger, 
Skolimoski, Rostow, etc. (66,85,106), have contributed significantly 
towards these objectives. 
WHAT HATH TECHNOLOGY WROUGHT? 
In 1945 certain extraordinary phenomena transformed the rate of 
change of technology; since then this accelerated trend has not stopped 
affecting society as a whole. It was not a single phenomenon: the 
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Atom bomb blast in New Hexico, the VE- or VJ Day, the advent of the 
computer or the miracle drugs, but an amalgam of collective events that 
have triggered a massive increase in technology, and through it, 
information. The quest is not to ascertain the cause of the 
critically-massed development of information, demonstrating almost an 
exponential trend, but to understand its behaviour and try to give 
information a certain form and thus assist society to comprehend this 
technological creation. 
Technology and information become almost synonymous when one 
views the mammoth amount of information that technology creates every 
day. This rampant and runaway trend known as information explosion has 
been overlooked by most technological theorists. Only certain 
information processing agencies have shown interest in providing 
state-of-the-art information separating the chaff from the up-to-date 
matter; and this they do only from the point of view of economics and 
commerce with no interest in understanding the phenomenon. 
To understand the phenomenon of technology and its consequence, 
we have to take into account the following factors: 
1. sheer population growth since 1945; 
2. our adeptness or lack thereof in the deliberate use of 
technology to achieve our goals; and, 
3. the nature and consequences of modern science and technology 
(82). 
Population growth since the Second World l~ar has exceeded the 
industrial growth and had it not been for the computer, which "arrived 
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just in time" to cope with the enormous bureaucratic workload and 
complex computational tasks (128), certain societal institutions, such 
as banks, justice agencies, social agencies, transport and commercial 
enterprises would have collapsed under the weight of the rapidly 
growing population. However, it is not the efficiency of the computer 
nor its diligence that is being questioned, but its use for certain 
dehumanizing purposes. Weizenbaum contends that computers ought not be 
asked to perform certain tasks requiring wisdom and raises three rather 
moralistic issues (128): 
creates 
1. natural language cannot be taught to a computer as the 
expressive powers of human words have an unrestricted domain 
of meanings while a computer is merely a superb symbol 
manipulator; 
2. decision-making should remain in the realm of man so that he 
could determine his own autonomy rather than rely on 
computers, which may become embodiments of law instead of 
merely law abiding machines; and, 
3. artificial intelligence (AI) and human intelligence should 
not be allowed to co-exist as AI is alien to genuine human 
problems and concerns (in motion picture Space Odyssey 2001, 
HAL 9000 computer illustrates an example however fictional). 
Mesthene (82,83) and Ferkiss (44) suggest that technology 
opportunities which dismiss Berdyaev's "industrial 
rationalization breeds unemployment, the greatest evil of the day" 
(14). 
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THE GENERATION(S) OF TECHNOLOGY 
A very different view suggests that technology is not a fixed, 
static entity which is thrust upon us, but it grows and changes similar 
to organisms and societies. According to Brooks (22), the evolution of 
technological knowledge is similar to biological evolution, although 
technological evolution is millions of times faster than the biological 
one. The part of genetic inheritance is played by the inherent logic 
of technological development, whereas the natural selection by the 
environment is played by social mechanisms of decision-making including 
the market. Competing technologies form part of the selective 
environment that determines the evolution of a technology. 
Technologies demonstrate ecological relationships with one another 
similar to the species in the biological world (22). The cancellations 
of the US supersonic transport aircraft and the breeder reactor program 
are cases of the extinction of endangered species of technology. 
The consequent evolution of technology from the first to the 
next generation is determined by internal and genetic events or logic 
intrinsic to the technological ecosystem. Just as the number of 
genetic variations is very large compared with the numbers that are 
propagated to the next generation as the result of natural selection, 
so is the number of technological possibilities very large with those 
that actually survive in the market (22). 
In this way, the environment of the technological jungle selects 
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the fittest who survive to the next generation. In technological 
evolution, what survives forms the knowledge base that again provides 
the full range of possibilities for the next generation of technology 
( 22). There are, however, cases of retarded evolution. One such 
example is a RAND Corporation study on dynamic-allocated 
packet-switching communications for the USAF. The USAF wanted a 
survivable system containing no central components but the study was 
shelved for several years after its publication in August, 1964 (105). 
However, later on with the computer environment this technology 
was revived and made the basis for computer-to-computer secure 
communication. This is an analog of coming to life of a biological 
entity which had been in the state of suspended animation until the 
environment was ripe. 
TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION 
Our discourse with technology is not from any philosophical or 
intellectual point of viel~. We are neither concerned with technology 
being the greatest evil of our time and a diabolic force with a 
momentum of its own; nor a benign power to solve all our national and 
personal ills. Also we do not see it as an intellectual passage 
through which time is travelling as if time were a dispassionate 
spectator watching a momentuous phenomenon. Our point of view is how 
information science sees technology and how technology is perceived as 
the generator of information. 
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New technologies create new information. In 1957 the launching 
of Sputnik I generated a considerable amount of scientific information 
about space hitherto unknown to man. Children learned about escape 
velocity, trajectories and liquid oxygen. Youth showed an immense 
interest in science. Universities in the West were flooded with 
students eager to learn and excel in any and every field of science. 
But over the past 25 years interest in science has faded. University 
enrolment has dropped. In 1982 with the advent of the Space Shuttle, 
the reusable technology, a new interest is seen by the youth in 
technological information. Youth generally do not see science as an 
avenue for their pursuit as they did a quarter of a century ago when 
they sought deeper and more cogent indoctrination in the precepts of 
science. They have turned away from science as being vague, 
theoretical, elitist, and have turned to technology and perceive it as 
precise, pragmatic and egalitarian. There are more applications to 
colleges of technology than to universities. Technology is perceived 
as the solver of all our problems in the 1980s, not just by youth but 
also by leaders of Western nations. In the closing speech at the 
Versailles Conference of the seven most industrialized \-Testern nations, 
the President of France reiterated that we should look to technology 
for the answers to our massive economic problems. Hence, technology 
has become the idol and the deliverer of the fate of the Western 
civilization. All we can see is that technology delivers information. 
New technologies create new opportunities as mentioned above, 
but they also create new information and every change in technology 
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brings about a change in information. Technology also consumes or uses 
a lot of information as well as generating it. If new information 
gathers faster than the old information is used we have a great deal of 
accumulation of information; if information is generated and consumed 
at almost the same rate then we would have a stable information store; 
however, if the information consumption is faster than its 
accumulation, we have a decay. 
Let us examine how changes in technology effect changes in 
information. If for instance a new external fuel tank, which is 
considered a very basic and unsophisticated technology in the aerospace 
field, is installed on an aircraft, it immediately modifies a lot of 
information about that unit. Besides altering the centre of gravity, 
it instantly changes the aircraft's: 
1. weight: 
a. empty, 
b. fuelled, and 
c. maximum take-off; and 
2. performance: 
a. take-off distance or roll, 
b. rate of climb, 
Co time to climb, 
d. service ceiling, 
e. maximum speed, 
f. cruise speed, 
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g. fuel flow, 
h. manoeuvrability, 
i. range, etc. 
These technological changes in turn generate additional 
information about the aircraft, generally known as modifications (mod 
1,2,3, etc.). Since the previous technical information about aircraft 
has become redundant or consumed or used, new charts, checklists, 
graphs, illustrations, tables, etc., have to be created and this 
information supersedes the previous one, not to mention the learning 
curve the human subject or the air- and ground crews have to go through 
to assimilate this new information. This information may again be 
superseded by either a newer modification of the fuel tank or some 
other avionic or armament equipment, which can spin still newer and 
different information. 
At some point every technological change becomes information 
change. When this happens technology becomes almost synonymous with 
information. Thus the faster the rate of change in technology, the 
faster the rate of change in information. But since so great is the 
rate of technological change with supersessions upon supersessions, 
that ultimately (the redundant or consumed) information begins to 
deteriorate or decompose. This phenomenon is specifically known as 
information decay. How fast and how much information decays depends on 
the rate of change of information with respect to time. But there must 
be some point up to which the information may still be of use. If we 
assume this point of consumption or usefulness of information as our 
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threshold, the juncture or cut-off instance, then we can also assume 
that information from this point onwards in time not to be useful in 
the technological environment. In the science of physics and chemistry 
such a decay point is measured in terms of "half-life". However, since 
information is not measured in the same quantitative scale as physical 
or natural science, since we have established a quasi-synonymy of 
information and technology, let us delve deeper into the nature of 
technology to verify the decay juncture. 
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3. WAR: 
1 2 
STRATEGIC THINKING AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS ' 
Concorde 
(a technological sonnet for the SST) 
Flap, flap, the vile solar wind is too fast, 
The sky's edge is curved to a hueless dark, 
The condor shivers the breakaway blast, 
Its mettle soaring like some swept-winged lark. 
Roll, roll, this cold, cloudless air is too rare, 
lYhere the crt,Jel ozone adorns and yaws, 
Where the pitch blackbird and the foxbat dare 
And fight their battles with bare, blinding claws. 
Bank, bank, your trim is far too high to swan, 
Your profile belies your frail swinging thing, 
That darts and dash's from dawn to dusk to dawn 
And breaks with time and sun's flinging cling. 
Oh, bird of paradise, you racy dove, 
How can one express you his deepest love. 
I. Ben-Tahir 
October 1976 
1. An abridgement of the partial requirement for special topics course 
CIS 492b: Strategic Thinking and Technological Advances taken under 
Professors C. B. Joynt, B.A., M.A., Ph.D, and D.J. Hillman, B.A., 
M.A., M.Litt, 1979-80. 
2. Reviewed by Colonel R.K. Buskard, B.A., CD, Director Air Plans, 
National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, the world has 
experienced numerous wars between nations and also wars within 
national boundaries, generally known as revolutionary wars or people's 
wars (36). During the period, 1945-65 there have been 30 inter- and 
intranational wars (86). 
The latest USSR military adventure in Afghanistan in 1980 
reinforces the concept that wars occur around the world at a certain 
frequency and are cyclical regardless of our abhorrence towards such 
banal carnages (32,37,86,111,120). 
A great number of people like war; war excites people and 
although some express their abhorrence, many are fascinated by it. 
Unless we understand the phenomenon of war, we cannot comprehend peace 
(52). 
The driving force in the war phenomenon is military technology: 
innovations that make weapons systems bigger and more destructive, or 
in some cases smaller and more accurate. History traces a number of 
persons famous in peaceful fields who were markedly military oriented. 
Michelangelo, Galileo, di Vinci and Nobel were all military engineers 
and had no qualms whatsoever in turning their inventions to military 
purposes (52). 
Military technology can neither be wished away nor 
"deconstructed" ( 13). It is a reality that we are faced with and is 
the leading force in the organization and development of (strategic) 
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doctrine (90). US Secretary of State Robert McNamara described 
military technology as having a momentum of its own; at odds with human 
capacity to comprehend it; and, out of control (130). 
War's primary element, strategy, according to Clausewitz, is the 
concept of the use of battles to forward the aims of war, in 
opposition to tactics, or the concept of the use of the armed forces in 
battle (8). However, Liddell Hart's twentieth century concept of 
strategy is "the art of distributing and applying military means to 
fulfil the ends of policy" (59). He considered economic pressures, 
propaganda, subversion and diplomacy combined with force, 'strategic'. 
Another British strategist perceives strategy as having inspired 
scientists and technologists during wars to achievements they would 
normally have considered impossible (59). However, Brodie (19) , an 
American political scientist sees "technology falling very short of 
being the name of the game which is strategy". Regardless of the above 
perceptions, strategic thinking or doctrine is an autonomous 
discipline, but is dependent upon technological innovations or 
advances. 
STRATEGIC THINKING 
Strategic thought (in the narrow sense) was concerned 
first of all with implications of nuclear weapons, and 
with the gradual awareness of these implications, it came 
to include diplomacy inasmuch as diplomacy is influenced 
by arms and, in particular, nuclear arms (8). 
Since the explosion of an atomic (fission) device at Alamogordo, 
New Mexico on 16 July 1945, 'strategic' (in the narrow sense) has 
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become synonymous with 'nuclear' •. The use of the word strategic, 
became current some time after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by 
the USAAF on 6 and 9 August 1945, respectively. 
A strategic objective is an objective not based on a geographic 
location but on a political decision (26). Strategic thinking is very 
much a product of circumstances, not just technological developments 
but also domestic and political developments (96). Therefore, 
strategic thought is not quite separate from political thought (8). An 
example would be formation and stationing of the USN Fifth Fleet at the 
mouth of the Persian Gulf in the 1980s. The oil supplies passing 
through the Strait of Hormuz have strategic implications for the tolest 
and the allocation of sea-, land- and air resources to further this aim 
of assured oil supplies would be part of strategic planning or thinking 
since oil has domestic and political implications. 
Strategic thinking transcends tactical decisions, which are 
short-lived and serve only a limited purpose in the overall strategic 
process. There are certain tactical concepts nevertheless, such as 
guerilla warfare and insurgency (and counter-insurgency (COIN)) 
operations, which have, since 1948 gained strategic importance in that 
tactical deployments have crossed over into the strategic realm (36). 
A good example could be insurgency in the Azores denying the US 
refuelling capabilities for their long-range contingency operations, 
thus supplanting a USAF strategic aim. 
Strategic thinking in the Communist World, specifically the 
USSR, differs from Western thinking insofar as the communists have a 
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great difficulty in reconciling technology with their Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. Capitalist classes and countries will be hostile; and based 
on their ideological conviction, the socialist countries want peace, 
the capitalists, war. Therefore, the Communist World must prepare for 
war (8). However, their pretense for peace does not seem to deter them 
from repeating the territorial aggrandisement doctrine prevalent in the 
eighteenth century of invading weak neighbours (viz., Afghanistan). 
Chinese and Soviet strategic thinking differ only in dialectic 
(style and form) and not in substance. They focus chiefly on the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons with each accusing the other of 
understating or overstating the problem (8). 
Strategic thinking, therefore, becomes the instrument of a 
country in its overall achievement of national objectives. 
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS 
Some technological advances may be so earth-shaking in 
their consequence that subsequent ones, however more 
sophisticated individually and impressive in the 
aggregate, cannot but be of diminished significance 
relative to the original device (19). 
Technological innovation will continue growing exponentially: 
"there was no hope of trying to stop this 'growling engine of change'"; 
and, society must learn to adapt to technology (39). Sputnik I 
launching on 04 October 1957 by the USSR was a triumph ( 67) in 
rocketry, missilery and space travel. It heralded not only an era for 
science (metallurgy) and technology (guidance systems) but also for the 
military of the superpowers and their allies. Even some Third World 
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countries, however unaffordable it may have been, launched ambitious 
programs to share the advent of the space age. 
The most significant technological innovation since the 
indus trial revolution is the microprocessor invented in 1971. It 
succeeded because it met the needs of the time using very little 
energy, raw material and capital. It represents a steady evolution in 
electronic componentry as valves (tubes in North America) gave way to 
transistors, which in turn were succeeded by increasingly sophisticated 
integrated circuits of the semi-conductors (39). At present a new 
micromini magnetic-bubble technology is under development with manifold 
capabilities exceeding that of the semi-conductors in the 
microprocessors (28). 
The mounting of a strategic (nuclear) warhead on to the launcher 
(missile) gave a new dimension to strategic thinking and many 
traditional concepts revered by strategists were shattered overnight. 
Even tactical commanders had to review their modus operandi to 
compensate for 
concurrently with 
technological innovations that became apparent 
the adoption of nuclear option by the military 
strategists, e.g., blast, radiation, fall-out, etc., that accompany 
nuclear weapons. 
Each technology creates its own particular environment, e.g., 
the computer has created a supraintelligence milieu in industry and has 
assumed paramountcy in military technology and doctrine: 
control and communications (c3). 
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command, 
A PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT 
Technology may be said to be driving strategic thinking, insofar 
as there is a causally significant interaction between technological 
innovation and doctrinal evolution of strategic thinking (64). This 
concept of parallel development of technological advances and strategic 
thinking can best be illustrated by U-2 aircraft overflights to detect 
the Soviet offensive capabilities, where U-2 technology resulted in the 
evolution of a strategic doctrine based on advanced electronic 
reconnaisance and photographic surveillance. In this particular 
instance both technology and doctrine developed simultaneously; the 
strategic objective was the foreknowledge of enemy's strategic 
(nuclear) potential and his ability to launch pre-emptive attack on the 
continental United States (CONUS) and its '-/estern allies. This 
supports Buskard's argument that a strategic objective is not based on 
a geographic location but is a political decision (26). 
Technology is not always the driving force; it did partially 
exist when the US decided to land man on the moon before the end of the 
decade: the 1960s. Here strategic thinking preceded technology, and 
every effort was made to create a technology to meet the requirements 
of the time. Other instances where the doctrine preceded the 
technological developments are: the cracking of the German dams on 17 
May 1943 and the manufacture of Mulberry, a harbour facility for the 
allies on the French beachead in 1944. But in both these cases the 
requirements were tactical and not strategic, as the scope of the 
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technological innovations was limited and contributed very little to 
the strategic objective, the winning of the Second World War (26). 
In certain instances technology has not responded to strategic 
needs: the German land mines in the Second World War that nearly 
stopped the advancing Allied tank forces in Europe and the ad hoc 
measure of the flail tank contraption was not a technological 
innovation and did only serve partially the tactical purpose to save 
the "queen of the battle" ( 64), hence the technological answer was a 
partial success. The present problem of radiation hazard at various 
nuclear power stations, a strategic requirement at a critical time of 
energy insufficiency, has no possible technological solution in sight. 
There are also cases where technology is so far advanced that 
the strategic requirement lags technology and technology becomes 
irrelevant. The Canadian CF-105 Arrow fighter aircraft which set 
several world records during its test flights (98) had to be scuttled 
on 20 February 1959, being too far ahead of its time as no one was 
in teres ted in purchasing this advanced technology. HMCS Bras d' Or, a 
hydrofoil craft which set a world speed record of 70.2 mph as the 
fastest warship on 17 July 1969 (80), was mothballed for basically the 
same reason, i.e., being too advanced a technology for integration into 
strategic doctrine. 
The data collected thus far for a parallel development of 
strategic thinking and technological innovation illustrate that: 
1. strategic doctrine may be precursor to technological 
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innovations; 
2. strategic doctrine does not lead technological innovation in 
most cases; 
3. strategic doctrine and technological innovations rarely 
develop simultaneously; 
4. technological innovation may be inadequate to meet strategic 
requirement; and 
5. technological innovation may be too far ahead for adoption in 
the strategic context. 
The parallel approach of strategic thinking versus technological 
innovation has a very low probability of occurrence and thus is not 
useful for our study. 
A DIALECTIC CONCEPT 
The concept of dialectic development in the realm of strategic 
thinking and technological innovation is one denoting an offsetting 
arrangement, not so much either doctrine or innovation following the 
other, but rather an action-reaction sequence with almost an aura of 
mechanical inevitability, where for every action there is a greater-
than-equal reaction (131). 
During 1945-50 Soviet defence expenditures declined and the only 
innovation in their: military inventory was a copy of the B-29 Flying 
Fortress, the Tu-4 bomber, code name: Bull. The second phase in Soviet 
defence expenditure was the Korean war build-up with MiG-15 and MiG-17 
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jet fighter aircraft (3). Alternatively, during the same period the US 
was developing an arsenal of retaliatory armament and was actively 
testing fission atomic weapons. The US by 1953 had adopted a 
"first-strike" (offensive) posture fearing a surprise attack by the 
Soviet bomber fleet and had developed a rather large Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) fleet of 500 B-47 and some slow and ineffective B-36 
pusher-type aircraft (67). The US also had some carrier-based aircraft 
that could have obliterated the USSR. Neither of the enemy aircraft 
described above had the speed nor the range to attack CONUS. Half of 
the $35-billion defence budget was spent on air defence systems against 
the bomber threat (67), and forward operating bases (FOB) as far as 
55°N in Canada, specifically RCAF Station Cold Lake in Alberta, were 
used to refuel and replenish the USAF SAC fleet dubbed the "chrome 
dome" for its •metallic • presence near the North Pole to retaliate 
against any Soviet aggressive intention. 
A string of more than 60 (now 31) radar sites known as the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was constructed in the Northwest 
Territories to detect and intercept the bomber threat. Even if the 
Soviet had conjured an attack it would have taken the aircraft 10 hours 
to reach CONUS (67). 
To offset the USAF SAC fleet, the USSR developed a strategic 
doctrine stressing (67): 
a. missilery; 
b. a powerful nuclear capability against the US allies in Europe 
with their medium-range bombers; and 
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c. rhetorics and bluff of their "first-strike" capability. 
Although the US weapons technology and strength grew immensely 
during 1953-60, the US was not sure that they could neutralize all the 
enemy's strategic forces during a possible first strike (6). 
The Soviet advance in missilery evidenced in the successful 
launch of Sputnik I, spurred the US on an irreversible expenditure 
spiral of strategic weapons development. It also led to the 
installation of the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) in 
Greeenland, Alaska and the UK, as the DEH Line was incapable of 
detecting objects flying above 100,000 ft. By 1959 the US had 8,000 
air defence vehicles (130), 600 B-52 and 1,400 B-47 strategic bombers 
(67). However, since 1956 the US had known from U-2 overflights that 
there was no "bomber gap"; and in 1960 they had proof that the estimate 
of 100 Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) was in reality 
only 35 (67). The "missile gap" was a cliche that helped Kennedy win 
the 1960 presidential election (5). 
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE 
In the early 1950s after acquiring an enormous A-arsenal (both 
fission and fusion weapons) the Dulles' "New Look" doctrine of "massive 
retaliation" or first-strike capability was unveiled by the US which 
feared a bomber attack from the USSR (Table 3-1). Massive retaliation, 
at best, was an ambiguous concept alluding to limited use of nuclear 
weapons to serve as a deterrent to the enemy lest he launch an attack, 
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Table 3-1. The development of doctrine-technology dialectic: the US 
strategic doctrine and weapons technology and USSR response, 
or in response to USSR response since 1945. (Doctrines are 
shown in quotes) (1,3,26) 
Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
USA 
A-bomb 
"Containment" 
Korean War 
H-bomb; B-36, B-52 
"New look: massive 
retaliation; first strike; 
deterrence." 
B-47, B-52 chrome dome 
H.-arsenal; DEW Line 
U-2; B-52D; IRBM, ICBM, 
SLBM 
Minuteman I (ICBM) 
US space launch 
B-52G/H; BMEWS 
U-2 downed over USSR 
"assured destruction; 
counterforce strategy; 
controlled response or 
no cities; damage 
limitation; worst-case 
planning; graduate 
deterrence." 
Hound Dog (ALCM) 
Manned space flight 
Titan II (ICBM); 
Pershing (SRBM); 
F-4C/D/E; F-4J/N; 
M-110 AI 203mm (artillery) 
A-6E 
Polaris A3 (SLBM) 
USSR 
Tu-4 Bull (B-29 copy) 
MiG-3 
MiG-9 Fargo 
MiG-15 Fagot 
A-arsenal (49-52) 
M-55 203mm (artillery) 
IL-28 Beagle; MiG-17 
MiG-17 Fresco 
H-bomb 
MiG-19 Farmer 
Tu-15 Badger 
Tu-95 Bear; Mya-4 Bison 
SS-1 (SRBM); Sputnik I 
Sputnik II 
SS-4 (M/IRBM); Su-7 Fitter 
ICBM tested 
MiG-21 Fishbed C 
Manned space flight 
H-bomb tests 
SS-5 (M/IRBM) 
SS-N-4 (SLBM); AS-3 
SS-N-3 (LRCM, SLCM) 
AS-4 (ALCM) 
Tu-22 Blinder 
SS-N-5 (SLBM) 
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Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Table 3-1. (continued) 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
USA 
Vietnam War; 
MIRV 
Minuteman II (ICBM) 
A-7E 
F-111 A/E 
Man on the moon 
"Adequacy or sufficiency: 
strategic parity; trip-
wire strategy." 
FB 111A; SR-71 (YF-12A) 
Minuteman III (ICBM, MIRV) 
Poseidon C3 (ICBM, MIRV) 
ABM Limitation Agreement 
Lance (SRBM) 
SALT I 
"Diad; triad; fourth 
arm of deterrence; 
MAD; hard-kill targets." 
MX; ALCM (cruise missile) 
SALT II? 
1980 AWACS/ROCC; 
NATO AEW/JTIDS; 
Beam technology 
USSR 
SS-9 (ICBM) 
SS-1 (ICBM) 
MiG-23 Flogger A 
SS-13 (ICBM) 
SS-12 (SRBM) 
SS-N-6 (SLBM) 
MiG-21 Fishbed K 
MiG-25 Foxbat 
MiG-27 Flogger D 
ABM Limitation Agreement 
SS-N-8 (SLBM) 
SALT I 
Tu-22M Backfire; 
Su-17, -20 Fitter C 
Su-19 Fencer A 
SS-17, -18, -19 
(ICBM, MIRV) 
SS-NX-17 (SLBM, MIRV) 
AS-6 (ALCM); MiG-29; 
SS-20 (M/IRBM, MIRV) 
SS-NX-18 (SLBM, MIRV) 
SALT II? 
SS-21 (SRBM) 
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Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
with a proviso that the doctrine will not be exercised in any local war 
against the USSR and China. The "chrome dome" of SAC B-36, B-47 and 
B-52D aircraft together with the DEW Line, served as counter-threat to 
the Soviet Tu-4 Bull (B-29 copy) which would have taken 10 hours to 
reach CONUS if they had had the range (which they did not) giving the 
US a 4-hour warning (26). If the Soviet aircraft were not detected by 
the threat-warning system and the counter-threat (SAC), they would have 
been easy targets for the US air defence vehicles: some 8,000 fighters 
and BOMARC missiles (130) alerted by Mid-Canada and Pine Tree radar 
lines. 
The emergence of U-2 technology had given the US a clear 
reconnaisance superiority from 1956 onwards and had assisted them in 
formulating their doctrine against surprise attack. Eisenhower's "Open 
Skies" proposal was rejected by the USSR as they were not able to 
counter the US reconnaisance technology and were wary of demonstrating 
their strategic weakness and lack of first-strike capability. 
Fearing the Soviet first-strike strategic capability, the US 
during 1961-66 developed a "counterforce" or "second-strike" capability 
such that if the USSR launched a surprise attack, the US could absorb 
the damage and yet be able to launch its own counterattack, thus 
neutralizing any advantage from a pre-emptive assault the Soviets might 
think they had. The counterforce doctrine was based on the advent of 
multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology 
the successor to a single-warhead manoeuvring re-entry vehicle (MARV) 
missile. MIRV gave the US the flexibility it was seeking in doctrinal 
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development to offset any gains the USSR may have made during the same 
period ( 1961-66). "MIRV changed doctrine, technology and bureaucratic 
politics" (67). 
Based on the fear of pre-emptive attack, the US deployed 1,056 
silo-based ICBM, 656 submarine-launched ballistic misslies (SLBM) and 
630 B-52 bombers during 1961-66 (67,92). However, in 1964 the Soviet 
strategic strength was placed at 200 ICBM; in 1969: 1,060; 1979: 
1, 398 ( 1) • Therefore in 1969 the USSR reached numerical parity or 
equality with the US in ICBM. The Soviet policy of nothing-less-than-
parity was thrust upon by the US during the Cuban missile crisis (1962) 
when Kennedy informed Khrushchev his strategic weakness known through 
U-2 overflights since 1956. 
By 1969 the SAC fleet was reduced by 62 per cent from 1959 
figures (67). The "triad" doctrine or a launch of ICBM, SLBM and 
strategic bomber force was to offset ICBM parity the USSR had 
supposedly gained in 1969. This parity also brought about another 
change in the US thinking with Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara's 
"controlled response" or "no cities" doctrine of 1962, whereby the US 
would not target its strategic weapons at Soviet cities, a far cry from 
Dulles' "massive retaliation". In the 1960s the US would have had a 
30-minute warning of a strategic attack to counter it with its own 
salvo. 
McNamara, however, stressed maintenance of a convincing 
deterrence and in "damage limitation" concept such tha_t in case of a 
pre-emptive attack the damage is minimal to the US population and 
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industrial centres ( 67). This strategic doctrine brought about the 
development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology and its 
deployment to protect such centres in case of a deliberate nuclear 
attack by the maintenance of a clear and convincing capability to 
inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. 
In 1966, four years later, McNamara realized strategic 
superiority as meaningless 
destruction" capability (59). 
mega tonnage, warheads, etc. , 
once a nation has achieved "assured 
He observed that comparison of missiles, 
bore little significance; and strategic 
parity, he thought, was an elusive concept, difficult to define and 
uncertain in its implications. Thus that year (1966) McNamara proposed 
to Johnson a treaty limiting ABM sites. (The treaty was signed by 
Nixon in Moscow in 1972). 
McNamara saw a thick ABM system as counterproductive: "If an 
aim is made extremely costly by expected adversary moves, because the 
threat is large and the advantage all on the other side, the game may 
not be worth the candle" (131). This is an extreme example of 
technological dysfunction that stopped a doctrine from nurturing. 
Also, Drs. Garwin and Bethe had demonstrated how Sentinel (ABM) system 
could be beaten in an article in the March 1968 issue of Scientific 
American (19). Even the cancelled B-1 bomber could have penetrated a 
10-fold increased ABM network (67). Thus the MIRV/MARV ABM decoy 
system became just that and the US has developed only one site in North 
Dakota, and the USSR two around Moscow and Leningrad. 
During 1966-69 the Soviets surpassed the worst-case estimates 
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offsetting the advantage the US had enjoyed up until then. This 
stalemate brought about the doctrine of "sufficiency" or "adequacy": 
parity in strategic weapons of the superpowers ( 6 7). During Nixon 1 s 
administration it was lauded as the basis for strategic armament 
limitation treaty (SALT I) talks in search for strategic stability. 
Also during the 1970s, the duration of a strategic attack was curtailed 
by another 10 minutes to a 20 minute warning of a pre-emptive launch. 
In the period immediately following, i.e., 1969-74, the US and 
the USSR both made great strides in weapons technology. The US SR-71 
(YF-12A) Blackbird reconnaisance/ surveillance supersonic aircraft 
flying at 100,000-ft altitude and 3.0 plus Mach number and its USSR 
counter-threat MiG-25 Foxbat, whose sole role was to shoot down the 
Blackbird, were introduced in 1969 and 1970, respectively. Also the 
threat moved to the manned bomber with the introduction of the Tu-22M 
Backfire-B intercontinental bomber, a contentious weapon at SALT II 
talks. Thus the Backfire brought about a revival of the DEW Line and 
accelerated the development of airborne warning and control system 
(AWACS) aircraft to direct air defence fighters against the Backfire 
threat over CONUS and Canada. 
The achievement of the "triad" concept by the USSR with its 
deep-sea force and SLBM has reduced the warning of pre-emptive assault 
on hard-kill targets to 5 minutes as of 1980 (47). 
The }cr system of MIRV ICBM on oval rails in the US Southwest and 
the Trident SLBM are yet other attempts to offset surprise attack by 
the enemy. One reason for these doctrinal/technological developments 
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was the short-warning attack capability of the enemy SLBM on SAC main 
operating bases (MOB) reducing the number of B52 strategic bomber 
deployment to two (1980) from nine (1960) after the receipt of 
warning. Thus any doctrine to negate the MX or the Trident system will 
require superior technological innovation by the USSR and even further 
curtailment of the present 5-minute short-warning threat. 
Bertrem (16) considers the doctrinal technological offset as a 
dilemma: the West discusses new technology long before actually 
procuring it, but the East assumes the discussions as statement of 
facts and seeks countering systems long before the West has developed 
the technology. Buskard (26) contends though, that the Uest has the 
technology to neutralize any gains the East may think it has achieved. 
One such instance is the MiG-25 Foxbat reconnaissance fighter 
manufactured in 1970 in response to USAF B-70 strategic bomber 
cancelled in the early 1960s because of technological obsolence (3). 
Klippenberg (73) reiterates Buskard's stance that the NATO nations have 
a scientific and technological tradition which would have a decided 
lead in the offence-defence balance against the Warsaw Pact, e.g., 
integrated c3 systems with up-to-the-moment information about Warsaw 
Pact manoeuvres. 
PLATEAUX OF STABILITY 
The stalemate or steady-state threat represented by the ABM 
offset gave birth to McNamara's other doctrines of "graduated 
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deterrence", the development of a spectrum of nuclear weapons ranging 
from the most powerful to the lowest yield (SO megatons to 0.5 
kiloton), or an improved conventional weapons capability, or both 
( 130); and, "flexible response", or the limited use of nuclear weapons 
with emphasis on conventional defence. 
A steady-state or stable balance typically involves: 
1. an invulnerable retaliatory force or deterrence; 
2. substantial capability of coping with limited aggression; 
3. provision for large-scale civil defence in case of war, or 
damage limitation (59); and 
4. a technology offset for each major adverse weapon development 
(26). 
"In short, we are probably reaching a plateau of relative 
stability in the category of strategic weapons based on their 
effectiveness, mobility and general invulnerability" (63). An 
equilibrium is hard to maintain in strategic doctrine or technology, as 
such balances are short-lived, a specific example is the cancellation 
of the USAF B-1 strategic bomber in 1976, and the emergence of a manned 
bomber threat by the Soviet long-range air force Tu-22M Backfire-B in 
1978 (although the first prototype was flown in 1974). 
STALEMATED DOCTRINE 
The "diad" doctrine of deployment of only strategic bombers and 
SLBM on the lower range of the scale of offensive power, and "triad" 
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doctrine with the "fourth arm of deterrence" deploying carrier-based 
aircraft becomes insignificant if the enemy uses "incrementalism" or a 
slow and deliberate action to gain and increase military and political 
power in the area of international strategy, rather than resorting to 
dramatic technological advances (Table 3-1). Even "assured 
destruction" becomes meaningless in the case of the eighteenth century 
doctrine of territorial aggrandisement by the USSR (Table 3-2) and 
tactical deployment for strategic gain (Table 3-3). 
From Table 3-1 we observe that the strategic doctrine in the 
beginning followed technological innovations, however, the trends 
became parallel in the case of U-2 deployment for strategic 
reconnaissance. Finally the strategic doctrine appeared as a reaction 
to "worst-case planning" by the US strategists, who overestimated the 
Soviet strength and thrust the US into an irreversible strategic 
weapons spiral. This, the Soviets presumed was an offensive doctrine 
and embarked on an ambitious program to attain strategic superiority 
(3). Table 3-1 demonstrates that the Soviet incrementalism works for 
their benefit, since they know full well they do not have to account to 
their people for defence expenditures (3). Some of the US strategic 
doctrine developments occur not from their own innovations or as an 
offshoot of technology but as a reaction to Soviet technology or 
doctrine. Such doctrines as "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) or 
total annihilation through miscalculation, irrational action or an 
accidental or unauthorized launch by either of the superpowers; and 
"trip-wire strategy", where even a low-scale conventional conflict in 
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Europe may trigger a nuclear response are not in the domain of the US 
and her NATO allies but are dependent upon the initiative of the USSR 
and Wars a\¥ Pact countries. Each of the US technologies and doctrines 
has been stalemated by USSR incrementalism (Table 3-1). 
HOW TACTICS SERVE STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 
The empirical data in Table 3-2 demonstrate the Soviet strategic 
doctrine of territorial aggrandisement as cyclical, that in general, 
every 12 years the USSR exercises the doctrine successfully, outwitting 
the \-lest during the intervening years aiming at "peaceful coexistence", 
"detente" and perhaps, "quiescence" in the future. It is as if to lull 
the West into a false sense of security and take the time to Sovietize 
the area as they do not have the ability to provide transportation, 
communications, etc., to some of their O\YU republics of the USSR. 
Table 3-3 shows an even more serious trend, however small. 
Every second year of her 5-year economic plan, the USSR produces a 
surplus of armament, which after outfitting (60): 
1. her O\YU armed forces and 
2. those of her allies 
3. is diverted to a Third World nation of the Soviet choice, 
to be employed to serve the tactical doctrine of war by proxy in areas 
which can destabilize the West. The effect is always favourable to the 
USSR because the area is of her own choosing and serves as an 
active-test laboratory for her weapons technology. The import of this 
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Table 3-2. USSR strategic doctrine of territorial aggrandisement* 
with an implication for 1992. 
Year Event/application 
1980 Military take-over of Afghanistan 
1968 Military intervention in Czechoslovakia: "Prague Spring" 
1956 Military action in Hungary 
1944 Annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
* Does not take into consideration : 
a. neutralization of Finland (1940) and 
b. neutralization of East-bloc nations (1945-50) because of 
Yalta agreement with the lolest. 
Table 3-3. USSR tactical doctrine of proxy action in the Third 
World (60) with implications for 1982-83, 1987-88 and 
1992-93. 
Year Event 
1977 Arming of Ethiopia to crush Somalia and the Eritrean 
cessationist movement 
1972 Re-arming of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces for 
1973 action: the Fourth Arab-Israeli war 
1967 Arming of Egypt and Syria for the Third Arab-Israeli 
war. 
1962 The Cuban missile crisis 
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tactical doctrine is strategic in that the USSR is aware that the US 
will not risk a nuclear war in a limited action and the gain is all on 
her side (8,19,36,96,126). Also war by proxy is generally fought close 
to the USSR rather than in areas with long lines of communications 
(LOC) (26). 
DOCTRINE, TECHNOLOGY AND ALLIANCE 
For the first 25 years after the Second World War, the world was 
monopolar with the US as the dominant superpower. The strategic 
doctrine of the 1950s and -60s was containment of the communist threat 
to the Third World. The US and her allies encircled the Communist 
World (Table 3-4). Also the USSR used buffer states to avoid direct 
contact with the US (26). 
The evolution of missile technology and satellite surveillance 
determined the changes in the US strategic doctrine which affected her 
allegiance to the allies. The intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM) (1 ,500-mile range) required placement of strategic weapons on 
foreign soil and the US maintanied air and missile bases around the 
world. But with the improvement of missile range and accuracy, 
specifically the deployment of medium-range and intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (MRBM, ICBM), the US became less and less dependent 
on her allies and significant cracks began to appear in her alliances 
due to reliance on technological superiority. 
A single event in 1971, the attack by a numerically-superior 
India on East Pakistan, a member of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
46 
(SEATO) and the creation of Bangladesh had consequences far beyond the 
event, in that, SEATO became defunct. Thus the "protocol extending the 
anti-aggression and economic provisions to South Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia" became impaired (34). The geopolitical gaping hole in the 
Western alliance drilled by the creation of Bangladesh and the 
withdrawal of Pakistan from SEATO in 1972 has left the Southeast Asian 
maritime countries with no cohesive military arrangement, and this may 
be one of the factors in the abandonment of Taiwan (Formosa) which was 
called the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Pacific. 
Table 3-4 The encirclement of the Communist l-lorld by the US and her 
allies 1945-72 (in west-east or clockwise direction). 
Country 
Greenland (Denmark) 
Canada 
Alaska (USA) 
Japan 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Phillipines 
Hong Kong 
South Vietnam 
Thailand 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Iran 
Iraq 
Turkey 
Greece 
Italy 
West Germany 
·Denmark 
Norway 
Iceland 
Major Alliance 
NATO 
NATO and NORAD 
NATO and NORAD 
US orbit 
US orbit 
US orbit 
SEATO 
Commonwealth 
US orbit 
SEATO 
Commonwealth 
SEATO, CENTO, 
Commonwealth 
CENTO 
Baghdad Pact 
CENTO and NATO 
NATO 
NATO 
NATO 
NATO 
NATO 
NATO 
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Remarks 
Left Seato 1972 
Invaded by North 
Vietnam 1975 
Left SEATO 1972 
Left SEATO and the 
Commonwealth 1972, 
CENTO 1979 
Left CENTO 1979 
Left the Pact in 
1958 (thus CENTO 
was formed) 
Left CENTO 1979 
No armed forces 
The loss of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to the communists, 
the Chinese and then the Soviet sphere of influence, further eroded any 
offset strategic gains the US may have had through technological 
supremacy through ICBM, SLBM, etc. 
The 1958 coup d'etat in Iraq ended the Baghdad Pact, but it was 
not as significant as the 1979 withdrawal of Iran from the Central 
Treaty Organization (CENTO) the successor to Baghdad Pact. This led to 
the abandonment of Pakistan for the second time in a decade, and which 
encouraged the USSR to adventure into Afghanistan. Thus the Western 
alliance has been adversely affected or is ineffective in the 
geographical region from east of Turkey to South Korea, and in major 
part because of heavy reliance on technologically-oriented strategic 
doctrine deploying ICBM, SLBM and SAC fleet ("triad"). This strategic 
doctrine has become dysfunctional as the US has lost many strategic 
objectives without firing even a single shot. 
The NATO alliance itself is in danger of disintegrating if 
Turkey is not technologically, economically, and militarily 
stabilized. If Turkey withdraws from NATO, the ensuing crisis may 
cause Greece and Italy to fall into the sphere of the USSR and the 
loThole Mediterranean would become a private lake for the Warsaw Pact. 
The West will have to re-think and devise a doctrine of "West of 
Gibraltar"or find offsetting technological innovation; to counter the 
loss. 
Furthermore, the West's reliance on the oil resources of the 
Islamic World cannot be relinquished to doctrines of weapons 
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"sufficiency" or "adequacy" adopted in 1969. This dated doctrine 
cannot resolve the tactical deployment (with strategic import) of the 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and in South Yemen, poised for a pincer 
attack in the Middle East in the near future. From Table 3-3, the USSR 
tactical doctrine of proxy action in the second year of each of their 
5-year plans indicates the USSR, having achieved tactical superiority in 
the region, can arm or re-arm any one of the countries to bring about 
instability in 1982 or 1983 (Table 3-5). Thus the Soviet proxy action 
in this region is bound to have repercussions for the West, especially 
for their oil supplies through the Persian Gulf, and no 
technologically-oriented strategic doctrine will assist unless the West 
realizes the potential problem and seeks innovative remedies which 
enjoy popular support in these areas. Confidence building even through 
the use of television-satellite technology to offset any gains by the 
communist ideology in this region is essential to Western interests, 
economy and strategic doctrine. In this case doctrine will have to 
transcend technology into the realm of "philapsychology". 
Any shift in the political structure of Turkey, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or Oman will greatly alter the 
strategic balance in favour of the USSR (62,122) and against the US and 
the West. Hence a doctrine utilizing technology to win the hearts and 
minds of the citizens of these countries, looking for remedies for 
their economic or political or military problems, is of paramount 
importance. 
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Table 3-5. Probable conflicts (wars and coups d'etat) through proxy 
action by the USSR affecting the West (1982-83, 1987-88, 
1992-93). 
Region Third World Nations 
Adversary I Adversary II 
South Asia India Pakistan 
Afghanistan Pakistan 
India and Afghanistan Pakistan 
West Asia Iran Iraq 
Iraq and Syria Israel 
South Yemen Oman 
South Yemen Oman and UAE (Emirates) 
Coup d'etat* 
West Asia Jordan 
Saudi Arabia 
Gulf States (one or more) 
Turkey 
North Africa Egypt 
Morocco 
* According to a former US ambassador (23,24) and a Canadian academic 
(112) every tactical victory by Israel against its Arab neighbours 
has led to a strategic loss for the West through radicalization of 
an Arab state and ouster of a pro-Western monarch. 
1948: King Farouk of Egypt (1952). 
1956: King Faisal II of Iraq (1958); Syria moved east (1960). 
1967: King Idris of Libya (1969). 
1973: Stabilization as Arabs considered it a strategic victory. 
1982: Probable radicalization of the remaining monarchies, Egypt. 
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Robert McNamara announced in 1962 his "controlled response" or 
"no-cities" doctrine, whereby the US would shun attacking the Soviet 
population centres with strategic weapons (67). This also served as an 
outstanding gesture on the part of the West as a confidence-building 
measure (CBM). 
Due to lack of technological tradition, the bureaucratization of 
military-industrial complex and the design lagging the demand (3), the 
USSR has turned to building conventional weapons far exceeding her 
military requirement. According to Wohlstetter (131), the philosopher 
Emmanuel Kant believed that nations undertook wars of aggression to 
escape the financial burden of maintaining a standing army. 
One of the applications of the Soviet tactical doctrine of proxy 
action in the 5-year cycle is testing of their military technologies 
(Table 3-5) to determine future strategic doctrine for their own 
battlefields against NATO. 
The battlefield experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War has had 
a profound effect on the strategic doctrine of both the superpowers. 
1. The rate of attrition of armament in a modern battlefield far 
exceeds the conventional logistics employed in classical 
battles. 
2. The battlefield is an active-test laboratory for the 
perfection of modern weapons ranging from surveillance to 
target destruction roles (118), specifically, the Early Bird 
satellite and the Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft which 
provided Israel with weaknesses on the Egyptian front, and 
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the use of SAM for destroying tactical aircraft (43) by the 
Egyptian and Syrian forces. 
The doctrines developed in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars 
changed several battlefield technologies. This had a definite affect 
on the Soviet operational doctrine in that Warsa\o7 Pact nations learnt 
that the tactical air force (F-4) can achieve results by destroying the 
enemy's air power on the ground (1967). To counter this they employed 
technology in two ways. 
1. They started an aircraft shelter program which is twice as 
large as NATO' s • 
2. 'l'hey introduced newer models of tactical aircraft (MiG-21J, 
-21K, -21L, MiG-23, Su-17 and -19) which bolstered and 
changed Warsaw Pact air forces from a defensive posture to an 
offensive one as the air defence role was dedicated to SAM: 
SA-4, -6, -7, -8, -9 and ZSU-23/4 automatic anti-aircraft 
artillery (AAA) (1978) (94). 
The technological battlefield's most important doctrine is the 
availability of tactical information. The problem with the 
sophisticated battlefield is not too little, but too much information 
for human endurance and assimilation(73). To meet this limitation the 
latest technological innovation is the integration of surveillance, 
navigation, communication, etc., into a joint tactical information 
distribution system (JTIDS), a wide-band, multipath, secure, data-link 
system processing tactical information for rapid decision-making by 
commanders (17,57). 
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JTIDS integrates navigation, communication and identification 
for aircraft operations into one system and provides only useful 
information (57). Using dynamically-allocated packet-switching 
techniques (105) and time-division multiple-access (TDMA) mode (57,105) 
of addressing through selective, pre-programmed, digital, bit-stream, 
synchronized transmissions, JTIDS can inform 2 to 98,000 addressees 
(17,57,68). This integrated system is effective against ECH or jamming 
by the enemy. 
JTIDS when fitted to airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, such 
as E-3A Sentry (Boeing 707) or Nimrod Mark I, can serve (by the 
mid-1980s) as a countermeasure against any short-warning attack the 
USSR may envisage against NATO; in CONUS it is known as airborne 
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Thus this technology 
would thwart the enemy doctrine, if any, of pre-emptive action. 
JTIDS fitted on AWACS and region operations control centre 
(ROCC), shipborne c3 system and Navstar global positioning system (GPS) 
will form part of an impregnable, integrated net known as worldwide 
military command and control system (WWMCCS), which will negate any 
advantage the USSR may think she has through a pre-emptive attack on 
CONUS. In the summer of 1980 a false alarm by WWMCCS (co~nonly known 
as Wimex) triggered two launches, at least one by Canadian Forces air 
defence interceptors, sufficient reason for the Soviet defence planners 
to be nervous henceforth of an accidental all-out attack. 
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LIFE AND TIME OF DOCTRINE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Regardless of the rigidity of each doctrine, it was surpassed by 
another doctrine with the advent of new technology. We have found 
stability to be only relative (3), and the doctrinal-technological 
balance quite tenous. Table 3-1 indicates how technological advances 
have altered the doctrines several times since 1945 in the following 
ways. 
1. The strategic pre-emptive attack warning time 
progressively been curtailed over the past four decades. 
Decade 
1950s 
1960s 
1970s 
Duration 
4 hours 
30 minutes 
20 minutes 
1980s 5 minutes 
has 
thus making c3 technology an integral part of the doctrine. 
2. The threat-counterthreat juxtaposition is cyclical, as it has 
gone through a complete cycle with the return of the manned 
bomber and the refurbishing of DEW Line after 20 years. 
3. The threat-counterthreat phenomenon demonstrates an effective 
life for doctrinal-technological changes or adversary moves; 
the effective life is a function of time (diminishing with 
each new development). 
Even alliances have demonstrated this trend in effective life. 
Where a treaty or a pact has not succumbed to an external agent, viz., 
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coup d'etat (Baghdad Pact), military action (SEATO) and revolution 
(CENTO), the deterioration has been internal such as we are seeing in 
the early 1980s with NATO nations' reluctance in accepting the latest 
US strategic weapons, the Pershing II missiles. 
All weapons systems have degraded with time due to advancing 
technology. Even complex systems, viz., the F-104 Starfighter of the 
1960s, became a linear system in the 1970s when Pakistan lost its entire 
fleet to the Indian MiG-2r aircraft, SAM and other superior technology 
which the USSR used as an operational doctrine in a limited war (to be 
discussed in Chapter 6). 
Each new aircraft is introduced as a technologically superior 
system surpassing all existing technologies, and with it, the 
innovation introduces a new or novel strategic doctrine. In the 1960s 
when the F-104 Starfighter arrived on the operational theatre there 
were renewed tensions in Europe. The erection of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 was sufficient to give the F-104 the impetus to become the 
standard bearer of the Western air forces. Several of the NATO 
countries, such as Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, etc., 
bought the US-built Starfighter. It was a superior and complex system 
that fitted the operational requirement as an air superiority fighter 
and the doctrine to use this technology as a tactical nuclear strike 
aircraft was formulated by the RCAF. There were no air defence SAM 
systems to restrict the F-104 in its mission at that time, nor any 
aircraft in the East-bloc inventory to match it. The F-104 reduced 
other fighter aircraft to linearity, i.e., if the speed-, 
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manoeuvrability- and altitude curves were to be projected graphically 
relative to the F-104, they would seemingly look like straight lines. 
Since the 1960s there have been great advances in aerospace 
technology. R&D has brought about aerodynamically agile aircraft: 
faster, more manoeuvrable systems, that would outfly, outclimb the 
F-104 air superiority fighter. Also the Warsaw Pact countries have 
deployed effective SAM air defences to negate the aircraft technology 
any gain it may have had (through attrition) and the doctrine of using 
the F-104 as a nuclear option had to be altered also. The role of the 
F-104 was changed from air-to-air, as an air superiority fighter for 
defensive counter-air mission deployment, to air-to-surface as a 
tactical nuclear weapons delivery system for interdiction by 
refurbishing its wings to withstand stress at supersonic speeds (Mach 
number 1 and 2) and to retain aerodynamic stability at extremely 
low-level flights. When Canada opted out of the nuclear arena, the 
F-104 (CF-104) was delegated to yet another air-to-surface role of 
close-air support (Appendix "A"). This would be analogous to training 
a mustang to be a race horse and then using it as a beast to plow 
fields (4). So the doctrine was put to pasture with the change in 
technology. 
Every time there is a technological change it brings about 
doctrinal change in the strategic thinking, so much so that doctrine 
(the theory) becomes a function of technology (the process). The 
change in technology as we have stated earlier (Chapter 2) is 
phenomenal according to every philosopher and commentator of technology 
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(13,14,41,44,48,51,56,64,74,81,82,85,88,104,113,114,127,128,130). They 
also agree that this rapid growth leads to rapid decay and we have 
observed changes in doctrine faster and faster since 1945 (Table 3-1) 
and this change or decay becomes a function of technology, just as 
doctrine has become a function of technology. Thus it becomes 
difficult to differentiate between a decaying technological innovation 
and a decaying strategic doctrine of war, such that doctrine becomes 
synonymous with technology. 
We have argued that technology is quasi-synonymous with 
information (Chapter 2). Now we have concluded that strategic doctrine 
is in the same way synonymous with technology. This would imply that 
war, too, is closely related to information. To comprehend this 
implication we shall first have to look at information itself. 
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4. INFORMATION: GENESIS-GROWTH-DECAY 
••• time is essential in all estimates of the 
value of information. 
Norbert Wiener 
In "The human use of 
human beings: 
cybernetics and society." 
Prima Donna she may be 
And prime she dons today 
But don wans and wanes away 
And prime is not to stay. 
I. Ben-Tahir 
In "Refractions 69. 
L'Ange sans merci." 
INTRODUCTION 
"In the beginning ••• " recited the US astronaut, Frank Borman, 
when he greeted the earth at Christmas 1968 from approximately a 
quarter of a million miles, while his three-man craft swirled around in 
space giving the inhabitants of this planet the first, first-hand 
video-information of their planet's natural satellite, the moon. The 
astronomical, geological and physical data that followed from this 
manned mission to the moon and other consequent voyages, were the 
first-known beginning of astrogeophysical (scientific) information in 
recorded history. Borman could not have chosen a more appropriate 
scripture than the Old Testament's first book of Moses, Genesis. 
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The ensuing lunar landing of 20 July 1969 demonstrated how 
aerospace technology served science in the accumulation of scientific 
information. The birth and growth of lunar astrogeophysics banished 
the previous beliefs held by the philosophers of technology such as 
Berdyaev and Ellul who had relegated science to the position of 
charwoman of technology (113) and a handmaiden of technique (74) 
respectively. Science regained its paramountcy over technology. 
Science is knowledge discovered through investigative processes 
by the recurrence of the same results to within an acceptable level of 
tolerance. If the same probability is attained in the results by other 
experimenters reproducing significantly selfsame (exact) results, it 
lends credence to the process and an ultimate faith to its nature. The 
collective enterprise of science, i.e., the generation, distribution, 
maintenance and utilization of information, gives science a broad base 
of knowledge. 
Information is knowledge in a communicative process, generally 
organized in some logical cognitive manner with time as a variable 
(70, 75). Information science is a scientific discipline that has 
emerged in the past 15 to 20 years and deals with the characteristics 
of how information is transferred or handled. This is of enormous 
importance in the processes of decision-making especially in the 
military environment for launching fighter-interceptor aircraft in 
pursuit of an unknown target on the radar. 
Approximately 10 million. persons in the US alone are concerned 
with the production and processing of information; 50 per cent of the 
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cost of running the economy is information costs (55). Enormous 
amounts of information are generated each year creating a mammoth task 
for the professionals in information science. Their capabilities are 
stretched to the utmost on qualitative problems of collecting, 
structuring, organizing, classifying, analyzing, storing, retrieving 
and disseminating information. This leaves the quantitative problem of 
the value of information quite unattended at present. 
The advent of manned space missions to the moon gave us the 
genesis of lunar astrogeophysical information. Although we do not know 
how this scientific information was accumulated due to security of such 
information and its non-availability for any academic discourse for 
some time to come, we can assume that this information grew during the 
period of lunar probes from 1968 and abruptly stopped with the last 
voyage commanded by Astronaut Eugene Cernan in 1972. Nevertheless, 
secondary knowledge may still be derived from rock samples and data 
accumulated during the space voyages prior to 1972. 
It would be fascinating to examine how this instant information 
was: generated when Astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin stepped 
on to the lunar surface; distributed upon their return to Earth; 
maintained as it accumulated for the next three years; and utilized in 
the process of information handling and transfer. 
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THE DESIGNS OF GROWTH 
"The most critical factor in a society is its communication", 
theorized Harold Innis, Canadian social historian and philosopher on 
communication (74). The mentor of Marshall McLuhan, Innis visualized 
the importance of communication. Since the end of the Second World War 
in 1945, the rapid growth in world population has increased the need 
for communication services and this has generated an enormous amount of 
information. This led the Canadian visionary of the 1960s, the 70s and 
the 80s, Marshall McLuhan, to establish in his lexicon the term: 
"Global Village" (74). Had it not been for the technological 
applications of information science (information or computer 
technology) to have emerged in time, certain societal institutions in 
the Western world would have collapsed. Coping with the enormous 
information overload would have boggled the bureaucracy (52,128) and 
would have created chaos for the lvestern civilization (industrialized 
nations). 
That scientific knowledge is cumulative and builds upon previous 
knowledge is the view of most professionals including a US information 
scientist, H.J. Hall and a Canadian academic, D.A. Redmond (56,101). 
Both stress that information generates as a linear function but 
successive growth( s) superimpose on previous accumulation(s) over a 
period, demonstrating information piling upon itself (Figure 4-1). 
Information can "decay" as well as grow. Generally, decay of 
information is in fact simply negative growth. With the exception of a 
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few rather long-lived cases, such as the ever increasing publication of 
the scriptures (as determined by their annual sales figures), the 
classic case, bell-curve (Figure 4-2) or near-bell-curve (Figure 4-3) 
and the short-lived or the rapidly perishing model (Figure 4-4) show 
information decay with respect to time. 
Information professionals further agree that as individual items 
of information become obsolescent and are superseded by new items, the 
latter process frequently occurs faster than obsolescence. This 
creates a cumulative effect or exponential growth, which gives 
information in this particular form a new dimension, known as 
"information explosion" (Figure 4-5). 
Information explosion was a phenomenon of the 1960s, when 
scientists and engineers realized the amount of scientific and 
technological information generated and accumulated surpassed the 
conventional abilities available to them to trap and assimilate 
information in a systematic manner. 
At this point appeared the information scientist: the right 
person, at the right time, in the right place, to alleviate the 
problems created by the information explosion. Regardless of their 
approach to the problems and to the nature of information growth, 
information professionals are in agreement that the growth of 
information has been exponential (10,15,20,25,54,55,56,71,72,77,95,101, 
107). 
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Figure 4-1. Cumulation of knowledge or information (101). 
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Figure 4-2. Life cycle of a unit of information (101). 
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Figure 4-3. Histogram of citations to periodical literature 
exhibiting a near-bell-curve (20). 
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Figure 4-5. Exponential growth: The "information 
explosion" (101). 
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In the 1980s the microelectronic information technology has 
taken the rampant growth of information to a new frontier which has 
affected the entire society: government, industry (and academia to a 
lesser extent). These institutions are now grappling with a new force 
called the information revolution (109). 
The "information revolution", according to the Science Council 
of Canada is: 
••• the use of microelectronics technology in robots, 
computer-aided design, electronic mail handling systems, 
electronic funds transfer systems, satellite systems for 
low-cost communications, improved traffic control 
sys terns, and a general and rapid trend in the use of 
computers in automating the storage, manipulation and 
retrieval of vast quantities of information. The 
exploitation of microelectronic technology offers 
productivity levels never before envisaged (109). 
The information revolution has brought about a fundamental 
structural change in the industrialized countries of the world and is 
more radical than the industrial revolution. For Japan, France and 
West Germany, keeping abreast with the massive growth and rapid change 
in the field of high technology for information capture is a matter of 
life or death. It is an aggressive policy in these countries to 
integrate government, industry and academia to research, develop and 
market these revolutionized information embodiments. 
To understand the growth of information we will first have to 
examine the mathematics of growth itself. 
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THE MODELS OF GROWTH 
In no nation in the world, other than in the US, can one observe 
such an appetite for unrestrained growth. 
The idea that "growth is good" is an item of faith with the 
Americans. Few people examine the rationale or logical bases for items 
of faith (10). 
The mathematics of growth is the mathematics of the exponential 
function and natural logarithms. These are usually illustrated by 
radioactive decay or the oscillation of the current in an R-L-C circuit 
(10,42). 
Exponential growth (and decay) is a consequence that occurs 
whenever we have a function N which changes in time in such a way that 
the change 6 N in N during a short time interval /:it varies directly with 
Nand with /:it (10). 
(Eq. 4-1) 
l:!.N/1:!. t = kN (Eq. 4-2) 
The time rate of change of the quantity varies directly with the 
quantity; therefore the greater the value of N, the faster it changes. 
k = (l:!.N/N)/ /:it (Eq. 4-3) 
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The constant k is then the fractional change (!J. N/N) in N, per unit 
time, !J.t. The dimensions of k are: 
1/time or (time)-1 
If k = +0.0875/yr; then N is increasing at 8.75 per cent per year. 
If k = -0.050/yr; then N is decreasing at 5 per cent per year. 
We have to determine a mathematic function which has the 
property that its rate of change is proportional to itself, viz., when 
function N is plotted against time, t (Equation 4-2), requires a 
proportional relationship between the slope, AN/!J.t, and N. 
We observe that if N = kt; kt2; k sinwt; we get a linear 
function; a quadratic function; and a sine function, respectively. It 
is easy to show that the rate of change of none of these functions 
satisfies our condition. Therefore, none of these functions meets our 
requirement. 
Let us examine the properties of the following function: 
N = N Akt 0 (Eq. 4-4) 
where A is a constant. Since N0 and k function as "dimensional 
constants", we can set both equal to unity without loss of generality. 
Figure 4-6 is a plot of N versus t for N0 = 1 and for k = 1 per 
second. We are thus plotting 
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(Eq. 4-5) 
for six different values of A ranging from A = 1.0 to A = 3.5. 
Comparing the slopes of the curves in Figure 4-6 at the point 
t = 0, for various values of A, shows the value for which the slope is 
equal to the function itself. 
We have determined the value of A when the slope of the function 
equals the value of the function, at k = 1 (10). 
Therefore, we have found the function for any value of A for 
which the slope of the graph of N = At at any point as proportional to 
the value of N at that point (10). 
We further determine the value of A, with, 
t = 0 
k = 1 
N = 1.000 (N =At (Equation 4-5)), as 
A~ 2.7 or 2.71828 ••• = e 
(e, being the base of the system of natural logarithms). 
Therefore, the function we sought to obey (Equation 4-4) is: 
N = N ekt 0 
k = 0, N = N0 for all values of t. 
(Eq. 4-6) 
Now that we have found the function for growth, our next quest 
is to determine the time, T2, required for information to double itself 
at that rate of accumulation. 
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Figure 4-6. The function N = N0 Akt is 
plotted as a function of time, 
t, for various values of k for 
N0 = 1 and k = 1 (10). 
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DOUBLING TIME OF GROWTH 
"It is useful to think of exponential growth in terms of 
doubling time, or the time it takes a growing quantity to double in 
size", stated Meadows, et al,, in the Limits to Growth (81), and 
Bartlett echoed this hypothesis (10). 
For positive values of k, Equation 4-6 shows that N increases 
with time, starting with the value N = N0 at t = 0. 
Let us find the time, t = Tc, required for N to increase by a 
factor C, from N0 to CN0 , using Equation 4-6. 
Therefore, CN0 = N0 e exp kTc 1 (Eq. 4-7) 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides, we get 
ln C = kTc (Eq. 4-8) 
Tc = ln C/k (Eq. 4-9) 
The time Tc for N to grow by a given factor C remains constant. 
For N to grow twice its initial value, we let C = 2, thus 
Equation 4-9 becomes: 
1. To simplify, exponential is expressed as exp kTc• 
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Tz = ln 2/k = 69.3/lOOk = 69.3/P (Eq. 4-10) 
where P is the per cent growth per unit time. 
The constantcy of the doubling time, Tz, is a remarkable feature 
of the exponential growth (Figure 4-7) (10). We have supposed k > 0 
and N is increasing but the same holds good for negative values for k 
where N decreases. In such a case the time required for N to decrease 
by a given factor C is also constant. 
The growth of N with time has a particular simple behaviour. 
Starting with N0 at t = 0, N grows to 2N0 at t = T2 ; it continues to 
grow to 4N0 at 2T2; at 3T2 it has grown to 8N0 and in n doubling times 
it has grown to znN0 • 
Table 4-1. The growth of the exponential function. 
T N 
t = 0 N = No = zON 0 
t = Tz = 2N0 = z2N 0 
t = 2T2 = 4N0 = z3No 
t = 3Tz = 8N0 = z4N 0 
t = lOTz = 1024N0 = zlON 0 
t = nT2 = 2nN 0 
74 
N 
I 2 
t (time) 
Figure 4-7. A linear plot of the growth or 
decay of N as a function of 
time, t, for several different 
values of the constant, k (10). 
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In Equation 4-10 we stated that P = lOOk and is the 
ever-constant value of the per cent growth rate per unit time. 
1-le know 
k = (llN/N)/ !1t (Eq. 4-3) 
and 
Tz = 69.3/P (Eq. 4-10) 
Table 4-2 illustrates the important relationship between the 
doubling time and the percentage time using Equation 4-10. 
Table 4-2. Doubling time in years for various annual growth 
rates (using 69.3 value). 
P (% per year) T (years) 
1 69.3 
2 34.-6 
3 23.1 
4 17.3 
5 13.9 
6 11.5 
8 8.66 
10 6.93 
15 4.62 
20 3.46 
25 2.77 
50 1.39 
75 0.92 
100 0.69 
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GROWTH AND DECAY 
The mathematics of decay is the reverse of the mathematics of 
growth. If k is negative, then the slope is negative (10). 
Exponential decline operates exactly the reverse of exponential 
growth; there is a constant proportional move (54). 
k = -(!J.N/N)/llt (Eq. 4-11) 
For negative k, the quantity N decays from its initial value N0 
to its ultimate asymptotic value. 
If the value decreases to half its initial value over a certain 
time, that period is expressed as "half-life" or T1/2 (54). 
Therefore, during one half-life, N decays from N0 to N0 /2. In 
two half-lives N decays to N0 /22 or N0 /4 (Table 4-3). 
Table 4-3. Relationship of half-life to decay of N 
Half-life N decay 
1 N /21 0 = N0 /2 
2 No/22 = N0 /4 
3 N0 f23 = N0 /a 
4 No/24 = N0 /16 
n No/zn = No/2n 
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The amount of decay in the first half-life equals the sum of 
decays in all the remaining time (half-lives), or 
(Eq. 4-12) 
THE AGE OF INFORMATION 
In physical sciences there is an empirical ordering of 
quantities to be measured but in information science such a measure is 
not obvious ( 125). Redmond (101), a Canadian, has used "number of 
publications" as a measure for amount of information (Figure 4-5) and 
US and British information scientists have used "number of citations" 
as a measure for information (15,20,25,54,71,72,77,95,107). 
Sandison, a British librarian, stated the growth of literature 
at MIT during 1945-68 as 5 to 6 per cent per year and established the 
doubling time for the information at 11.5 years (16). Using Table 4-2 
we see his figures for doubling time, T2, of 11.5 years correspond to 
an annual growth of 6 per cent per year (10). 
Oliver, another British information scientist, considered the 
rate of growth to be based on two factors (95): 
1. the number of scientific papers published, J; and 
2. the number of contributing scientists, C, for each· of the 
years to be considered: 0 and T. 
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As the numbers of papers grow, the papers age more rapidly being 
superseded by new ones; as the number of scientists grow the usage of 
the papers decreases such that it would age more slowly. 
However, if the rate of growth of the above two factors are 
equal, i.e., .aging becomes constant. 
His theory requires the estimation of: 
1. the growth rate, s, of the number of contributing scientists; 
2. the growth rate, g, of the number of papers; and 
3. the possibly-varying rate of aging or annual aging factor: 
a0 and at for well-defined subjects over a period of T years. 
Thus the relation is: 
1 - at = (1 - a0 )e exp (g - s)T (Eq. 4-13) 
An estimation of the quantities a0 , at, g and s requires 
measurements of: a, J and S for years 0 (1963) and T (1968) (87): 
(Eq. 4-14) 
(Eq. 4-15) 
Citation counts were used to estimate a0 and at• Approximately 
400 citations to published periodical articles only were analyzed for 
the years stated. Both samples were collected in two batches to 
determine whether any variations which might occur between them were 
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Figure 4-8. Graphical estimation of the annual aging factor 
(a = 0.79) of semiconductor physics literature 
(95). 
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of significance. Figure 4-8 illustrates the plots of the cumulative 
sums of citations with time; a is calculated graphically. 
Brookes (20), another British information scientist, carefully 
explained the phenomenon of growth of scientific information that 
Oliver (95) had elaborated. He estimated the doubling time of 
scientific literature at 10 years and Griffith, et al, at 11.5 years 
(54). This agrees with Sandison (107). 
Brookes' (20) (modified) geometric distribution of growth gives 
us: 
p(t) = (1- a)(1 +a+ a2 + ••• + at-1) (Eq. 4-16) 
According to this distribution, when a reference (citation) is 
made to a particular periodical (scientific information journal), the 
probability that the reference made is to a volume of age t is: 
(1 - a)at-1 
where a, the annual aging factor is a constant for all values of t and 
< 1. (When t increases, a increase~ but for short periods only (20)). 
Figure 4-9 is a graphic illustration of Brookes' geometric 
distribution demonstrating both continuous negative exponential and 
discrete geometric approximation. 
The series (Equation 4-16) converges to a finite sum, U, when 
a < 1. U is the utility factor. 
If 
1 +a+ a2 + ••• at-1 + ••• = U (Eq. 4-17) 
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0 5 10 
t (years) 
Figure 4-9. The continuous negative exponential 
and discrete (stepped) geometric 
approximation (linear scale) (20). 
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then also 
1 + a(1 +a+ a2 + ••• at-1 + ••• ) = U (Eq. 4-18) 
so that 
1 +aU= U = 1/(1 - a) (Eq. 4-19) 
similarly, if 
U(t) = at + at-1 + at-2 + • • • (Eq. 4-20) 
=at (1 +a+ a2 + ••• ) 
U(t)/U(O) = at (Eq. 4-21) 
In Figure 4-9, the initial utility U(O) will be the area under 
the curve; while the residual utility U(t) under the curve from point t 
to infinity. 
If we know the numerical value of a, we can calculate the total 
sum of the series using Equation 4-22: 
1 +a+ a2 + ••• +at+ ••• = 1/(1- a) (Eq. 4-22) 
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and any partial sum from Equation 4-23: 
1 +a+ a2 + ••• +at= (1 - at-1)/(1- a) (Eq. 4-23) 
If 1,000 references were made to a set of scientific 
publications with an annual aging rate of 0.875 during its first year 
after publication, then 875 references would be made during the second 
year; 1,000 x 0.8752 for the third year, and so on (95). 
Table 4-4 gives the details of aging using a constant factor, 
0.875. 
Table 4-4. Utility of scientific information using a constant 
aging factor, a= 0.875. 
Year an Citations 
1 (0.875) 1,000 
2 0.875 875 
3 0.8752 766 
4 0.8753 670 
5 0.8754 586 
6 0.8755 513* 
* half of the citations or 50% 
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The total number of citations (references) is then: 
U = 1,000/(1 - a) (from Eq. 4-23) 
= 1,000/(1- 0.875) = 1,000/0.125 = 8,000 
Therefore, 8,000 citations would be made during the entire (infinite) 
life of the information (publication). 
Using Equation 4-21 we can deduce any residual sum of the 
series, as: 
at = U(t)/U(O) (Eq. 4-21) 
t ln a = ln U(t) - ln U(O) (Eq. 4-24) 
Figure 4-10 is a plot of U(t)/U(O) on a log scale, and t on a 
uniform scale. Any specified value of U(t)/U(O) can be read directly 
from the graph with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes 
(20). 
From the graph we can read that for a = 0.875, 50 per cent of 
the citations were utilized after 5.2 years and that U(t)/U(O) = 0.135 
when t = 15 years. 
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THE LIMITS OF INFORMATION 
Half-life of information was first cited in scientific 
literature by British professionals: Bernal in 1958 (15) and Burton 
and Kehler in 1960 (25). The latter observed that the half-life used 
in nuclear physics and chemistry, a decay function of radioactivity is 
the time required for the disintegration of one-half of the atoms of a 
sample of radioactive substance. For a given material any of the 
half-life periods in physical sciences are of equal duration, i.e., at 
any given time, the half-life of the remaining material is the same as 
the half-life of the original mass. In contrast the half-life for 
information is not definable in precisely the same manner because 
scientific information remains but becomes unused (25). Line 
(77) defines "half-life as the time (actual or expected) '\l'ithin which 
half the total use of individual items constituting a literature has 
been or is expected to be made." In the similar fashion the point at 
which the residual utility is 50 per cent is also known as the 
half-life of information (10,20,25,54,72,77,95,101,107). 
The half-life of information varies among sciences. Different 
physical sciences demonstrate different half-lives (Table 4-5); geology 
enjoys the longest half-life of 11.8 years and metallurgy a mere 3. 9 
(25,71,101,103) • 
• • • growth patterns of a subject field can be described 
rather well by half-life data. The literature of stable 
sciences show longer half-lives than those undergoing 
major changes in content or technique ••• more theoretical 
(sciences) may show longer half-lives (25). 
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In scientific literature the half-life of the subject also 
changes, viz., transistor literature being superseded by semi-conductor 
literature in the discipline of microelectronics. 
Table 4-5. Age of journal articles at time of use (years) (71). 
Field/Subfield Average Half-life Average Half-life 
age for for age for for all 
citations citations all uses uses 
Physical Sciences 9.7 2.3 0.2 
Physics 4.6 
Chemistry 8.1 
Mathematics 15.0 10.5 
Computer Science 5.9 
Environmental Sciences 8.8 
Geology 11.8 
Engineering 7.4 
Chemical 4.8 
Mechanical 5.2 
Metallurgical 3.9 
Life Sciences 11.2 
Physiology 7.2 
Botany 10.0 
Cancer 0.25 
Psychology 10.4 0.9 
Social Sciences 11.9 
Other Sciences 12.2 
All Fields 10.8 0.2 
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The algol."! thm used by King (71) for Table 4-5 is hereunder 
described: 
••• to calculate the half-life of citations ••• for the 
National Science Foundation ••• we took a sample of 
articles that we published in the United States in 1977 
in science and technology. We then took a random 
sample of citations from the sampled articles and 
determined when they were published. (We also 
contacted the authors and got information about the 
citations from them). In this way, we determined if 
they could not use this data to compute the mean 
(average age of citations) or the median (half-life). 
The difference in observed number of citations of 
articles published each year (1977, 1976, 1975, ••• ) 
are attributable to (1) the age of the cited article 
and (2) the fact that more articles are published in 
recent years (i.e., there were fewer articles 
published, say, in 1960 than in 1977). Fortunately, we 
had estimates of the number of articles that were 
published back to the 1800's. What we did then was to 
normalize the number of articles published each year to 
a common basis by dividing the number of articles 
published in 1977 by the number published in any given 
year. We multiplied that ratio times the number of 
observed citations published in any given year. This 
yielded an adjusted number of cited articles for each 
publication year. Then we summed up the total number 
of adjusted citations over the years. Then we 
determined what year the half-life occurred by 
cumulating the adjusted citations up to the year when 
one-half the total was cumulated. Fractions of years 
was estimated by linear interpolation (72). 
Burton and Kehler in 1960 (25) described the curve for the 
half-life of a scientific literature as exponential in character: 
(Eq. 4-25) 
where y = cumulative percentage (expressed in decimals); x = time, t, 
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in decades; and (a + b) = 1. Their curve also satisfied the boundary 
conditions of: 
x = 0; y = 0 (excluding references not yet published); and 
x = ~ y ~ 1 (all citations included in all references 
published) • 
The curve was then fitted to data and the x-value corresponding 
toy= 0.5 was calculated, i.e., 
(Eq. 4-2Sa) 
Burton and Kehler (25) also discussed decay of classic 
literature versus ephemeral literature; however, Redmond (101) 
describes the difference between ephemerality and obsolescence as 
differences in time scale only. Furthermore, Redmond reiterated that 
all information becomes obsolete sooner or later ( 102). Grum (55), a 
US academic and soldier agrees that information perishing is inevitable 
and the rate of perishing, M: n), is a decreasing function of time. 
p(n) = 6(n - 1)/6(n) for 6(n) * 0 (Eq. 4-26) 
p ( n) + 0 as 6 ( n) + 0 (Eq. 4-27) 
6 ( n) is a non-increasing function of n which represents the expected 
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future reward of the information of the next n periods; if h(n) = 0, n 
has perished. 
Line (77) uses Brookes' series (Equation 4-16) for C, the number 
of citations to literature published in the last year cited. The total 
number of citations would be: 
T = c +co+ cD2 + co3 ••• con (Eq. 4-28) 
where D is the time or corrected obsolence factor. 
The above series can also be expressed as 
T = C/(1 - D) (Eq. 4-29) 
Half-life then, is the number of terms in the series required to 
reach the point where half the citations have already been made, i.e., 
T/2 = C/2(1 -D) (Eq. 4-30) 
Given a, the obsolescence factor and g, the growth factor, Line 
defines the corrected half-life, h as: 
C(1 - oh)/(1 - D) = C/2(1 - D) (Eq. 4-31) 
(1 - oh)/(1 - D) = 1/2(1 - D) (Eq. 4-32) 
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Therefore, 1 - nh = 1/2 
nh = 1/2 = o.s (Eq. 4-33) 
According to Burton and Kehler (25) the half-life is attained 
when y = 0.5; we also have nh = 0.5 
Therefore, nh = y (Eq. 4-34) 
If we wish to determine the value of the half-life itself 
ln D = h ln D = ln 0.5 (Eq. 4-35) 
h = ln 0.5/ln D (Eq. 4-36) 
But D = ag 
Therefore, h = ln 0.5/(ln a + ln g) (Eq. 4-37) 
THE EJECTION OF INFORMATION 
"Aging for a specific literature is defined in terms of that 
literature being cited by other documents ••• " stated Griffith et al 
(54), and outlined four distinct cases: 
1. All literature cited by all literature. 
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2. All literature cited by a specific journal. 
3. A specific journal cited by all literature. 
4. A specific journal cited by a specific journal. 
Griffith 1 s algorithm ~Tas Brookes 1 model: cumulating all the 
citations and then subtracting U(t), utility for each year from U(O), 
initial utility; then fitting the aging constant a, by eye to the 
resultant graph. This was done in cases, where: 
1. literature aging was: 
a. all literature, or 
b. a journal; 
2. the aging was reviewed by: 
a. all literature, or 
b. a specific journal; or 
3. it was a possible combination of 1 and 2. 
Such visual fit of data was accurate to +0 .01 (.±.1 per cent). 
With experience, they developed another simple mode of fit based on 
only citations to literature 10 years or older (54). 
Griffith found the aging constant a, to be 0.89 (approximately) 
for scientific information from 1940-75 (54). This is closer to 
Brookes' estimate of 0.875 or 0.88 (20). 
During the First and Second World Wars aging rate slowed down to 
approximately 0.96, but the contributions were also small (54) and the 
remainder of the time, a = 0. 94, or 6 per cent growth, which is 
considered well within others estimates (20,95,107). 
According to Figure 4-11, two relatively constant aging rates 
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emerged: 
a = 0.89: relatively recent scientific information and 
a= 0.94: long-term information aging (historical). 
Brookes ( 20) confirmed Line's historic usage of 10 or more 
half-lives or 99.9 per cent of the total usage (time); however, the 
usage during different periods for the same scientific subject may be 
different (Table 4-6). 
Griffith, et al (54) agreed with Brookes (20). They reiterate 
rapid aging as "essential to certain processes in carrying out 
science", and used Brookes' model for aging. 
Brookes was seeking a discard point or a threshold beyond which 
utility of scientific information had fallen to a minimal level (20). 
He uses the expended half-lives as cumulative mode for the aging of 
scientific information, i.e., after two half-lives as one fourth of the 
initial information remain~, three-fourths has been consumed, etc. 
To this same end, Griffith (54) assumes an aging rate of 94 per 
cent for certain scientific information (biomedical literature) 
(or a= 0.94). This means the growth rate was 6 per cent per year, 
i.e., each year's publication received 6 per cent more use than those 
of the prior year. However, Griffith ar.gues, if we know by counting 
the number of articles that the literature grew by 2 per cent per year, 
then the adjusted rate of change, everything being equal, is: 
6% - 2% = 4% 
which establishes the aging factor a, at 0.96. 
Table 4-7 displays aging of scientific information revealed 
through the citations by various journals. 
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Figure 4-11. Aging of all literature cited in the Science 
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SCI are plotted as described for the Brookes 
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the disruptive effects of the Wars; and 
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Table 4-6. Cumulative half-lives effect on the usage of information 
(percentage). 
Number of Information used 
half-lives (percentage) 
1 50 
2 75 
3 87.5 
4 93.75 
5 96.9 
6 98.4 
7 99.2 
8 99.6 
9 99.8 
10 99.9 
Table 4-7. Aging of literature as revealed in the citations by 
various journals (54). 
Citing journal Aging rates Aging rates 
(a) for annual (a) for annual 
compilations of compilations of 
all citations only citations by 
by the journal journal to itself 
1974 1975 1977 1974 1975 1977 
-- -- -- -- -- --
P NAT ACAD SCI o.8o 0.80 0.80 0.74 0.74 0.75 
J MOL BIOL o.8o 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.81 
LANCET 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 o. 79 * 
0.61 0.61 0.61 ** 
PHYS REV LETT 0.81 0.83 0.83 o. 72 0.72 0.76 
BR MED 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.80 0.85 * 
0.66 0.61 0.55 ** 
SCIENCE 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.79 0.82 
BIOCHIM BIOPHYS 
ACTA 0.84 0.84 0.84 o. 78 0.78 0.78 
J CUN INVEST 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 * 
N ENG J MED 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.84 ** 
0.68 0.71 0.71 
AM J CARD 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.77 0.75 
CIRCULATION 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.78 
J COMP PHYSIOL 
PSYCH 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 
*For U(4) - U(10); **for U(O) - U(3). 
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Griffith (54) begins with Equation 4-21 of Brookes' model , and 
proposes to estimate a. 
hypothesis, when: 
The data generated a strong and amiable 
1. a = 0.88, 50 per cent of the total citedness or information 
is exhausted within 5 years of publication; and 
2. a .$ 0.90, more than 90 per cent of the total information was 
exhausted within 20 years of publication. 
These two values should be of assistance to information managers 
in controlling almost any information explosion (54). 
Brookes (20) adheres to a hypothesis expressed in Figures 4-2 
and 4-9 that the bulk of the information stays close to one end of the 
geometric distribution (time) and a steady depreciating tail extends 
theoretically to infinity. Half or 50 per cent of the used information 
will be under half the area of the curve Figure 4-9. Redmond (101) 
agrees that the distribution curve is asymptotic such that the value 
never reaches zero, i.e., that old information does not die, it simply 
becomes less and less desirable. Redmond uses 95 per cent usage for 
certain specified sciences: metallurgy, 17 years; and geology, 50; 
thus illustrating inherent inertia of a more stable scientific 
discipline. 
Three British information professionals: 
(108) and Urquhart (124) criticize Griffith, 
Brookes (21), Sandison 
et al (54) for their 
approach to the aging of scientific literature. Although Brookes (21) 
agrees partially since Griffith uses Brookes' model (20), he objects to 
the correction factor stating: 
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If a literature grows in volume, it is not because the 
scientists contributing to it work at an ever-increasing 
rate but because more scientists are attracted to that 
field. The rate of revision of the earlier literature 
is thus speeded up; as the rate of growth increases, so 
does the rate of revision (21). 
Sandison (108) is much more critical. 
But the effect of age operates forward through time, so 
that decay in the reverse direction should not be 
considered as aging without special explanation ••• 
Cumulated population cannot decay: they only grow 
forward through time (108). 
Sandison considers the US approach as naive. Urquhart (124) considers 
it "a mistake to assume that actual requests for journal volumes 
dwindle to vanishing point with age". 
THE THRESHOLD OF INFORMATION 
We have so far seen the birth, life and decline of information. 
The information revolution created by microelectronic technology has 
shown us how rampant the growth of information is and how Western 
industrialized governments are planning national strategy to keep ahead 
in the war over information. Ministers sit beside industrialists 
during international trade talks to demonstrate the importance of the 
information revolution. But what they do not know is the faster the 
developments in information capture are taking place, the faster is the 
rate of obsolescence. Information in such sciences as metallurgy 
demonstrates a relatively short half-life of 3.7 to 3.9 years 
(25,71,101). It is also true of electronic physics (20) but a 50 per 
cent decay takes quite a long time for the slower moving sciences of 
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botany, geology and mathematics (71). 
The growth of information bewilders most people: it is simply 
because most people cannot comprehend growth, limitless growth, in the 
field of information. "The greatest shortcoming of the human race is 
man's inability to understand the exponential function", said Bartlett 
(10); but the same is true of the exponential decay. 
Information grows and we have demonstrated this cogently, but 
all the growth is not new. Not all the scientific information 
generated is new; most of it is re-cycled information along with some 
newness. Therefore, the information that accumulates is not all 
"fresh" information, 
information. 
but fresh protected with layers of old 
We have demonstrated we can quantify information in both its 
growth and decay. We have seen decay through usage such that new 
information is used more often than old information. People are 
interested only in using new information added to a corpus of 
knowledge. In part this is analogous to the surface mining of outcrops 
before venturing to subterranean extractions. However, this is only 
partially true since the raw material to be mined is finite, while 
information is continually generated. 
We kno\IT that information is used and used frequently. What we 
want to know now is the usefulness of the information itself. No one 
buys yesterday's newspaper unless it is useful to that person. The 
extent to which this informationis useful is our quest. If we are to 
put a value to the information, we must also put a limit on this value 
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beyond which the information is of little use to us. Information then 
would become similar to milk in a carton with an inscription indicating 
its decay date, after which the milk is useless. Suppose we assume for 
information a figure of 50 per cent after which the information is of 
little value to us. Thus we have arrived at the half-way mark, in the 
usefulness of information, the point at which we may want to discard 
it. We have mentioned this at various points as the "half-life". 
Therefore, the half-life of information then is: 
1. the time when half of its utility has been consumed; 
2. the time at which 50 per cent is utilized; or 
3. the time when half of it is depreciated or perished. 
We know that the faster the information is generated, the faster 
it reaches its half-life, or decays. The bureaucrat, perplexed by the 
information revolution, should heave a sigh of relief that the 
information appearing at an exponential rate is disappearing just as 
fast, being superseded by new and fresher information. It is simple to 
calculate the half-life of information and then to discard that item of 
information as irrelevant when the time has elapsed. For instance, the 
manuals that are generated, or the scientific reports that are written 
all become useless with time. No one looks at the training manual for 
the CFlOO Canuck aircraft, nor the Kinsey report (because both are now 
defunct). 
We have established half-life of various sciences, and also we 
have established that such a syndrome exists for information. Let us 
examine if this applies to other information systems: to technology 
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and to war, as we have established them to be separately analogous to 
information. We shall observe whether technology and war, both, 
demonstrate decay, and whether the rate of decay of information is fast 
in a rapidly perishing information system, such as a technological war, 
or slow such as in the case of a slow national upheaval or revolution. 
This should give us an idea to understand peace, a more stable 
information system or how to attain and maintain it. 
One of the most peaceful human endeavors has been man's voyage 
to the moon. It captivated the imagination of the human race. It also 
captured a considerable amount of information about the other world of 
our world. 
We as a civilization observed the genesis of lunar 
astrogeophysical information with the US astronaut Frank Borman in 
December 1968; the growth of such information with man's first lunar 
landing with Neil Armstrong in July 1969; and the abrupt termination of 
information culminating to instant start of decay with the departure of 
Eugene Cernan from the moon in December 1972. We saw the entire span 
of a new science, information science, without even realizing its 
impact on our civilization. Had Neil Armstrong kno~m it, or as we see 
in retrospect, his first utterance on the moon should have been: 
"One small step for man, one giant step for information science." 
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5. CONFLICT: THE FIGHTING INFORMATION SYSTEM 
There is no such thing as an ultimate weapon. 
- Captain James Beadling, USAF 
Assistant Professor of Aerospace Science 
Otterbein College, Westerville, Ohio 
1959 
Information is the ultimate weapon. 
INTRODUCTION 
- I. Ben-Tahir 
1982 
In the previous chapter we have observed how information is 
generated, grows and eventually decays with respect to time; and that 
the rate of information perishing is a decreasing function of time 
(55). In Chapter 2 we described how information changes rapidly in the 
defence environment, specifically the ephemerality of technology in the 
aerospace field. Every slight change in technology effects change in 
information to a point that technology becomes almost synonymous with 
information. In Chapter 3 we established that technology is the 
driving force behind strategic thinking and war, and every 
technological innovation has brought about a change in the doctrine of 
war or strategic thinking so much so that it becomes synonymous with 
technology. But since we have also stated that technology is analogous 
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or almost synonymous with information, this implies that war too is 
synonymous with information. 
We have established the decay or the "half-life syndrome" as an 
important point in the information phenomenon. In this chapter we 
shall examine if there are other systems which exhibit the features we 
have reviewed in Chapter 4. This would mean the development of 
mathematical models which would give us an understanding of these 
information systems as well as enable us to demonstrate the models as 
applications. 
THE LIMITS OF WAR 
Since the Second World War ended with the nuclear bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945, the world powers have realized 
the awesome or awful destructive capacity of strategic weapons. 
Therefore, since 1945, to avoid a nuclear holocaust of the Third 
World War, a new concept of limited war has emerged (96). The doctrine 
was developed as a response to the Korean War ( 1950-53) and had a 
two-fold implication (96): 
1. to mitigate the danger of an all-out nuclear war; and 
2. to support the policy of containment of communism. 
Limited war has become a fact of our time ( 126). The war for 
the Falkland Islands was a principal example of a limited war where the 
conflict was limited to a geographical area of 200 miles radius around 
the islands. From 1948 onwards, people's revolutionary wars have 
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gained momentum and strategic importance (36) thus outflanking the 
second part of the above doctrine established by the US, the 
containment of communism. 
Che Guevara added a corollary to the doctrine of the limited war 
which stated that in order to create victory for the proletariate, 
conditions for communism do not have to be ripe, but war or anarchy can 
create the necessary conditions (36). 
It was the concept of limited war that got the US involved in 
Vietnam (19). A monopolar world had emerged after the Second World 
l-Iar, with the US on top, prior to Vietnam. The US wanted to teach 
Vietnam a lesson using the most sophisticated technological innovations 
(96). But the US learned three very fundamental precepts. 
1. Victory does not usually come to the strongest party 
in a limited war (contrary to the doctrine) (8). 
2. Technologically superior force can be a 
dysfunction in a limited war (the USAF and USN air 
fleets competed with each other to produce high 
sortie rates and tonnage dropped with no significant 
conquests, winning "data" but no "territory") (19) 
3. No regime which cannot assist itself against a 
revolution or subversion can be helped through the 
intervention by a powerful ally (96). 
But what is not understandable is the reason why the US got 
involved in the limited war after having learnt in Korea that it is not 
easy to fight an ideologically-enthused enemy on the Asian mainland. 
Even though the US had a school of "never again" generals who were 
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adamantly against any US involvement in Vietnam, the bureaucracy was 
able to tilt in favour of the involvement. Perhaps these officers were 
dismissed as 'generals fight the last war; academics the next'. 
The answer to this puzzling question lies in a very mundane 
area. The US was aware that Vietnam was extremely rich in a certain 
strategic element, Wolfram, commonly known as tungsten. It is used in 
aerospace technology and the military-industrial-scientific complex 
(MISC) was quite aware of its significance. 
"Vietnam, and the whole of Southeast Asia is extremely rich in 
tin and tungsten; and it was a long-recognized US movement in this area 
for the mineral resources", stated Tupper, an economic geologist 
( 122). Other geologists agree with this statement as the best-known 
most-kept secret of the Vietnam war (58,117). 
The US is six per cent of the world population but uses 33 per 
cent of the world's minerals and to guarantee its economic growth and 
technological well-being, the US must retain its mineral resource 
sources (122). 
The US was engaged in an undeclared and unpopular war to contain 
communism and to restore freedom and democracy according to most 
historical documents, and there has never been any hint of US 
intentions on South Vietnamese tungsten deposits. 
It is ironic that after such a debacle, the largest deposits of 
Wolfram (tungsten) were discovered in Canada at the border of Yukon and 
Northwest Territories (122). 
The USSR too has had its share of limited war experience for 
precisely the same reasons in Afghanistan. Prior to the armed 
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intervention in that country the USSR had conducted an extensive 
geological survey of Afghanistan and informed that government that 
there were no significant deposits of any minerals of consequence. 
However, in the Tadzikh Soviet Socialist Republic, a few miles from 
where the USSR-Afghan-Pakistan-Chinese borders converge, the Soviets 
have the biggest open-pit gold mine in the world. If the Soviet have a 
gold mine in proximity to Afghanistan, it can be inferred that their 
diagnoses were intentionally deceptive. 
The UK as well was not fighting for just the territorial 
integrity of a colony of 1, 800 people, 8, 000 miles away in the South 
Atlantic. The Malvinas Basin between the Falkland Islands and 
Argentina is supposed to contain a significant quantity of oil, 
approximately 500 million to five billion barrels. However, the 
British do not just claim the Falkland Islands and its dependency, 
South Georgia, but also the South Sandwich Islands, the South Orkney 
Islands, the South Shetland Islands extending all the way to the 
Antarctic continental shelf known as the Palmer Land. This is the 
surface of a very large submerged archipelago ( 99). (British troops 
invaded the South Sandwich Islands on 20 June 1982 and took prisoner 20 
Argentine scientists manning a weather station since 1976 (with the 
acquiescence of the British since 1977) (89)). 
If Argentina were to own the Falkland Islands when the Law of 
the Sea comes into effect, it could lay claim to the entire archipelago 
and would have energy for its future needs for up to more than 100 
years (This is the claim of a Canadian petrologist commissioned by the 
Argentine government to survey the area up till 1981 (84)). If the 
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British were fighting for the rights of their subjects who wanted to 
remain loyal to the Crown, why did the UK relinquish reign in 1981 over 
Belize, a Central American colony (population 144,857 (1980)) which 
wanted to remain as such? An even more interesting case is that of 
Hyderabad Deccan, which the British abandoned in 1948 (Appendix B). In 
both cases, these countries did not serve British interests. 
In the above three cases which have involved the top three 
powers in the world, each power had the same mot! ve to conduct a 
limited war: to gain or regain natural resources. In the case of the 
US, they had insufficient information about the resources, as proven by 
the Canadian geological community (58, 117, 122). In the case of the 
USSR only fragmentary information is available. Until they stabilize 
the Afghan rebellion, which may take years, we will not know the 
outcome of that information (The British fought three Afghan Wars, 
(1838-42; 1879-81; 1902 (86)) but had to withdraw from the country 
after tactical battlefield victories, due to continued harassment, 
extreme resistance and uncontrolled insurrection). The UK had 
potentially good information (84,99) to launch a limited war against 
Argentina in the Falklands. 
Thus we deduce that the limited wars fought by the big powers 
are not to uphold the rights and the freedom of the people who would 
othendse be oppressed by a lesser power, right or left, but for what 
they could gain by applying the doctrine of limited war. As Sorokin 
( 104) said: " ••• wars and revolutions were not disappearing but would 
grow in the twentieth century to an absolute unprecedented height." 
The war between equal powers such as the one fought by Iraq-Iran 
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(1980-82) showed a gross miscalculation by Iraq. Had Iraq waited until 
1982 to launch its attack, the outcome would have been different (Table 
3-5) with the USSR supplying its excess latest weapons to its client 
state. Apparently Syria is the recepient of Soviet armament after its 
losses in the 1982 Israel-Lebanese war. 
There is an addendum to the doctrine of limited war: "If a 
total war is ever to break out it is most likely to be the result of an 
escalation of a limited war" ( 126); and that total war will be fought 
most probably in Europe (8). 
THE PRESCRIPTION FOR WAR 
Under ideal conditions, war is fought with surpluses of 
energy and resources, such as the Allies waged in World 
war II. A more risky proposition is to fight to secure 
the enemy's energy and resources in the hope of 
continuing the war with them -- this was the idea behind 
Hehrmacht 's drive for the Caucasian oil fields in 1941. 
The message of the 1973 oil crisis was therefore as 
simple as it was ominous: the era of abundant energy is 
over ••• the seriousness of this threat to our collect! ve 
security now looms so large that it cannot be ignored, 
for without the output of the oil fields and industry, 
our forces will be no more than inert masses (78). 
A historical example of the above thesis is why the Ardennes 
counter-offensive by the German forces, generally known as the Battle 
of the Bulge, was abruptly terminated in December 1944. The Germans: 
1. could not capture the Allied fuel storage as per their 
schedule; and 
2. ran out of fuel on the battlefield as a consequence. 
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The German ability to conduct war was seriously curtailed by the 
immense numerical superiority of the Allied forces. They did not match 
the German technological superiority either in weapons development 
(rocket-powered vengeance weapons V-2, the precursor to the modern 
missile and jet fighter aircraft) or in innovative technology, such as 
petroleum fuel produced from coal. 
The only country at present which uses this process is South 
Africa, which has an abundant supply of coal amongst other strategic 
minerals on which the toJest is utterly dependent for its economic growth 
and strategic stability (discussed in detail in Chapter 6). 
~ole have observed the motivation of the big powers (US, USSR, UK) 
to apply the doctrine of limited war when a key ingredient is a 
strategic resource of significance for their technological well-being. 
The denial of such a resource could not just bring about economic 
hardship, but reduce the strategic capability considerably , perhaps to 
the zero point. The example of the Ardennes counter-offensive and the 
worriscme revelation of Leitch (78) indicates the vulnerability of 
Western military forces. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for limited actions in the past was 
the low cost of fuel and materiel, but this has changed immensely since 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the consequent oil embargo and the formation 
of the oil cartel, spiralling energy costs to exceed materiel cost for 
the first time since the industrial revolution. An example of such a 
cost can be seen from the British action in the Falkland Islands. The 
estimates for the loss of ships alone puts it at $1 billion (with the 
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number of ships lost exceeding the D-Day figure). The cost of other 
materiel losses and subsequent expenditures is put at $5 billion (40). 
This demonstrates: 
1. that the attrition rate is greater than anticipated by 
defence planners; and 
2. that even a power with minor relative capability can inflict 
enormous damage to a big power using technology as its 
doctrine, e.g., the Exocet stand-off missile. 
The theory of relative capability dynamics and extensive war 
emerged from examining hegemonic behaviour of major powers since 1450 
(37). Doran (37) observes that as a nation grows in power relative to 
other nations its capacity to influence events and to exercise 
leadership grows; and when this capacity wanes the nation's ability to 
influence international politics diminishes. This political 
development of a major power is manifest in a cyclic pattern, and he 
defines the cycle as "a period of time during which something is 
established, reaches a peak, and declines." 
This theory argues that relative capability is composed of two 
dimensions ( 37). 
1. Size of a nation which is often indexed by: 
a. gross national product (GNP), 
b. territory or area, 
c. armed forces, 
d. military spending and 
e. population. 
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2. Development of a power which includes variables such as: 
a. per capita income, 
b. urbanization and 
c. technological sophistication. 
Relative capability follows a cyclic dynamics with the upper 
limits pre-ordained by: 
1. terri tory, 
2. initial capital and 
3. natural resources endowment, 
which affect the length of the period, and the height of the 
ascendancy. 
Figure 5-l is a graphic illustration of relative capability of a 
state under ideal conditions. 
The focal points are the two inflection points b and d 
and the two turning points a and c. • • It is at these 
points the government is most vulnerable to overreaction, 
misperception, or aggravated use of force which may 
generate massive war (37) 
The points a and c are clearly important, however a nation does 
not perceive itself as beginning to decay until after the process is 
set in. Likewise, a nation does not know that it has reached its abyss 
until later. The points b and d are exceedingly difficult to perceive, 
nevertheless the idea of cyclic growth and decline of power is 
important. 
Toynbee (48) argued that all powers follow a similar cyclical 
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Figure 5-l. Generalized curve of relative capability. 
a,b,c,d,a', are critical points; t =time; 
dy/dt = rate of change (velocity) in 
relative capability over time; and d2y/dt2 
= rate of change of change (acceleration) 
in relative capability over time (37). 
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a' 
dynamics; only in his discourse he dealt with civilizations, which in 
contemporary terms can be called states. He postulated that each 
civilization undergoes the same phases or dynamics. 
1. Genesis: the birth of a nation by overcoming obstacles. 
2. Growth: the "etherealization" of a nation-state into a 
power. 
3. Decay: the breakdown from within resulting from the 
shortcomings not decreed by law but human failure; a few 
effete individuals gain a stranglehold over power, thus 
becoming nemeses to creativity, and finally bring about the 
disintegration and dissolution of the state. 
Toynbee (48) suggested that the. decay phase of a power can 
extend over years: tens, hundreds and even thousands. He put the 
decay of Egyptian civilization to be from 1600 BC to 500 AD, or 2,100 
years. 
During this cycle of relative capability, the state which meets 
all the imperatives of ascendancy(37) or is in the growth phase (48) 
influences international decisions and wages wars. 
THE GENESIS OF POWER 
To understand relative capability, we must examine the 
mathematics of the basis of this power. Figure 5-l illustrates a 
curvolinear graph, which if scrutinized closely may be able to unravel 
the cycle. 
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Figure S-2 illustrates a point y, a variable, which may be in 
arbitrary units. Let y be dependent on time, t, that has elapsed from 
some agreed fixed instant. If we let the value of the variable y at 
time t and y + IJ.y at time t + !J. t, then the average change in the 
variable per unit of time during the interval !J.t is: 
!J. y/ !J.t 
This ratio gives us a measure of how fast the value of y is 
changing over the interval !J. t; the smaller !J.t is, the nearer we get to 
a measure of how fast the value is changing at the time t. In fact, by 
taking !J. t small enough we can make the ratio !J.YI !J.t differ as little as 
possible from the differential coefficient, also known as the first 
derivative: 
dy/dt 
which is the limit of the ratio as !J. t + 0 (45). 
Therefore we assume that the rate of change of y at the time t 
is defined to be the value at that time of dy/dt, the differential 
coefficient of y with respect to time, t. This is the rate of change 
of y then, commonly called the velocity of y. 
114 
t (time) 
Figure 5-2. The rate of change (first derivative) for 
each point on the curve; with positive 
rate of change signifies a rise in the 
level of relative capability; and negative 
rate of change indicates a decline. The 
rate of change is non-linear and 
non-monotonic, rising or falling to 
different degrees (with differing slopes 
over time). (The inset to the left is a 
conceptualized, magnified version of where 
the tangent meets the slope) (37). 
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However if we wish to discover the rate at which the the rate of 
change is changing, we will have to take many points of dy/dt such that 
we form a curve of these values. The derivate of that curve is: 
d/dt(dy/dt) = d2y/dt2 (Eq. 5-l) 
Figure 5-3 is a graphic representation of this rate of change, 
which we commonly call acceleration or the second derivative. 
When the acceleration is positive 
(Eq. 5-la) 
and the velocity is increasing. 
When the acceleration is negative 
(Eq. 5-lb) 
and the velocity is decreasing. 
But when it is neither positive nor negative, then 
(Eq. 5-lc) 
and the velocity is a constant. 
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t(time) 
Figure 5-3. The rate of change of change (second derivative), 
the changing slopes of the tangent lines of the 
velocity curve; acceleration is neither constant, 
linear, monotone, nor always positive (37). 
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THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 
To appreciate how a state generates power we will have to 
observe the infrastructure or the components that make up the cohesive 
force which gives the state the relative capability (32). Chi (32) has 
developed mathematical models which represent internal conflict in a 
system. 
Let us assume a one-dimensional issue continuum in a three-actor 
system, S, with A1, A2, and A3 as the actors. Let us assume the zero 
point to be any convenient point on the continuum, as it will not 
affect the generality of our discussion. We can easily change our 
equation by adding an appropriate constant, to reflect the actual value 
of an equilibrium position of a particular system. We shall represent 
this as a line where points are value of the variable Y. The poles are 
a graphic convention to avoid possible confusion (Figure S-4). 
To make the three-actor system work, we have to make the basic 
assumptions of: rationality, unimodality and additivity. 
1. Assumption of rationality. Suppose A2 tries to have its 
political goal adopted as the policy for the political system 
or the government, and tries to move S to the right. 
Contrarily, A1 tries the same towards his position. Since 
the resources available to the actors A1 and A2 are limited, 
they have to act rationally to mobilize support for their 
positions. In support of this goal we assume three strategy 
principles for every actor (32). 
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NEGATIVE 
LEFT 
Figure 5-4. An issue continuum of a three-actor 
system: A1, A2 and A3 (32). 
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POSITIVE 
RIGHT 
a. Equal efficiency. Every actor is equally efficient in 
transforming his mobilized resources into political power 
in support of his political action. 
b. Parsimony. Every actor tries to minimize the spending of 
his resources while trying to maximize the attainment of 
his political goal. 
c. Proportionality. The amount of resources to be mobilized 
by the actor is proportional to the threat against the 
attainment of his political goal. 
2. Assumption of unimodality again takes three forms: 
a. each actor prefers only one policy position with respect 
to the given issue; 
b. actor A1 is optimally satisfied only if his policy 
position Y1 coincides with the policy adopted by the 
system, i.e., Y1 = y; and 
c. the greater the discrepancy between the actor's policy 
position and any policy adopted by the system, 
(represented by the position y), the greater the 
dissatisfaction, di• 
(Eq. S-2) 
The quantity di is also the threat faced by the actor A1; 
thus the larger the value of di, the greater the urgency 
for A1 to try to redress the situation. 
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3. Assumption of additivity. Given political pressures P1, Pz 
••• Pi from actors A1, A2 ••• Ai, the resultant pressure P, 
then is: 
P = P1 + Pz +···Pi (Eq. 5-3) 
(This also leads to a method of issue reduction for the 
system to handle several issues simultaneously as if only one 
issue were dominating the system S (Figure 5-5)). 
We already have established that every political action creates 
a pressure P which affects the system S along the Y issue continuum 
(Figure 5-4) at a given time t. However, all possible states of S at 
various points in time constitute the range of the political process 
(32) or the growth of the internal power. 
The political process has three major attributes: 
1. current state of the process; 
2. rate of the process or the rate of change (first derivative); 
and 
3. modification in the rate of the process or rate of change of 
change (second derivative) (38,45). 
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Figure 5-S. The method of issue reduction in the 
case of two issues. The angle Y1SY2 
has a cosine equivalent to the 
correlation between two variables 
associated with two issues under 
study. P1, the action vector is the 
direction of the pressure 
desired/created by A1; the length 
represents the level of pressure A1 
wants to exert on S (32). 
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Table 5-l The effects of the major attributes on the political process 
Attribute 
Current state of the process 
Under pressure P, S moves either 
to the right (positive) or left 
(negative); the direction of the 
process is the same as the 
direction of P. 
Rate of the process 
Let y be the current state of S 
on the issue continuum. Under 
pressure P, S moves in either 
direction. If y is the position 
as a function of time, then the 
rate of change of the process is 
dy/dt. 
Effect 
when P = 0; S is immobile 
P > 0; S moves right (+) 
P < 0; S moves left (-) 
when dy/dt = 0; s is immobile; 
y constant 
.. dy/dt > 0; S moves right (+) 
y increases 
.. dy/dt < 0; S moves left (-) 
Modification in the rate of the process 
Under pressure P, S moves along 
Y; howeve~ the rate of the 
process is not assumed to remain 
constant, i.e., it may be 
accelerating or decelerating: 
its change is d2y/dt2. 
when d2y/dt2 = 0; S is immobile 
or moving at a 
constant 
velocity, or 
dy/dt = k 
" 
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d2y/dt2 > O; S changes 
direction from 
left to right 
or moves to the 
right faster 
and faster 
d2y/dt2 < 0; S changes 
direction from 
right to left 
or moves to the 
left faster and 
faster 
We suppose the system begins in a state of equilibrium 
(dy/dt = 0; d2y/dt2 = 0) with the system in position y. The proposing 
of a new policy amounts to the establishment of new desired position, 
Yp• If Yp is to the right of y, then A1 has two choices: 
1. slow down the process of implementation; or 
2. attempt to move the policy to the left. 
1. Slowing down would not need any action or application of 
pressure P by A1 on the system S as long as the condition 
stays stagnant or the policy is proposed but not implemented 
or dy/dt = 0 (constant); therefore, P = 0. 
If P = 0, then d2y/dt2 = 0 
2. To move the policy to the left, some action by A1 to generate 
pressure P would be needed: 
(Eq. S-4) 
where a is a positive constant • Using the assumption of 
. additivity we can use this for a multi-actor scenario, with 
pressures P1, P2, P3 ••• Pi• 
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The greater the P on the system, the greater is: 
or the more revolutionary the process. If the absolute value 
of the second derivative (acceleration of the process) is an 
indicator of the level of change in S, then this depends 
upon: \ 
a. the level of pressure P, and 
b. the value of a (the positive constant or the system 
attribute which indicates level of resistance to change or 
a measure of political inertia, cultural factor particular 
to each system. The greater the value of a, the larger 
the Pis needed to induce change). 
THE DECAY OF POWER 
The political actors are not always the undifferentiated 
government at one pole and the apathetic public at the other, but are 
categorized by their actions as (27): bureaucrat, politician, 
anarchist, excited citizen and external agent. 
We will have to view the actions of all of these actors to 
ascertain the final outcome and its eventual consequence on Western 
technological society in the following chapter. 
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The bureaucrat is assumed to have a political goal and a certain 
capability in mobilizing his resources for goal attainment in the most 
efficient and rational manner. He implements policy formulated by the 
politicians: seemingly apolitical, neutral on any issue, and 
unconcerned with the policy position assumed by his masters. He wants 
stability for himself and his organization, prefers job security, shuns 
transfers or changes in his organization and does everything he can to 
slow doW!l the rate of change, which threatens his well-being. The 
bureaucrat does not have to be an individual; it could be an 
institution, organization or even another state, which is capable of 
dampening: the direction, the rate of change and the rate of change of 
change, viz., the superpowers, whose fear of nuclear holocaust helps 
them dampen any escalation of international tensions. The bureaucrat 
is happiest when: 
dy/dt = 0 (Eq. 5-5) 
and any change in its value, negative or positive, worries him. Being 
a rational actor he uses the proportionality principle to prevent 
change: 
pl a: dy/dt 
Therefore, P1 = -b(dy/dt) (Eq. 5-6) 
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where b is a positive constant; and the negative sign implies that the 
pressure is being applied in the opposite direction. If b = 0, the 
bureaucrat is incapable of mobilizing resources, hence impotent or 
incompetent. 
The goal of the bureaucrat is to stop any political change by 
applying pressure. 
Therefore, P = P1 (Eq. 5-7) 
where P is the resultant pressure to counter the action of the system. 
Therefore, a(d2y/dt2) = -b(dy/dt) 
or a(d2y/dt2) + b(dy/dt) = 0 (Eq. 5-8) 
The solution of the above equation describes the state of S as a 
function of time, t. 
(Eq. 5-9) 
where the exponent coefficient m = b/a; m thus varies directly with b, 
or the political capability of the bureaucrat, and inversely with a. 
The bigger the m, the faster the system S, reaches equilibrium. 
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Therefore it appears from the second-order differential Equation 
S-8, that the bureaucratic process is one of exponential decay (32). 
Figure S-6 illustrates the exponential decay of bureaucratic 
action when k1 :> 0, or positive. At initial time, t = 0, S is at 
Yo ~ k1 + k2 and moving gradually to a position of stable equilibrium 
Ye = k2. If we assume the position of equilibrium as the zero point, 
then: 
y = ke-mt (Eq. 5-10) 
The politician is more interested in his policy position with 
respect to his political goal and least interested in the stability of 
the system, S. Let the politician's position be represented at zero on 
the issue continuum. He applies his pressure, P2 , to move y in either 
direction to bring it closer to his position on the issue continuum. 
The greater the absolute value of y, the greater is the threat to his 
policy position, 
Therefore, P2 a: \YI 
or P2 = -cy (Eq. 5-11) 
where c is a positive constant. 
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{a) ( b ) 
t(time) t (time) 
Figure 5-6. Bureaucratic process along time, t. When the 
constant k1 is positive, the process decays 
exponentially. k2 is the level of 
saturation (32). 
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Therefore, P = P2 
(Eq. 5-12) 
lfuen the above Equation 5-12 is solved, we get the state of the 
system as a function of time. 
(Eq. 5-13) 
where u = (c/a) exp 0.5 
The effect of the politician's action creates an oscillatory 
process which makes the system S move back and forth around his policy 
position called the unstable equilibrium position (32). This is why 
the bureaucrat considers the politician as a baseless vase (Figure 5:-7). 
The process has a cycle, T 
T = 2~((a/c) exp 0.5) 
and an amplitude, R 
The anarchist's political goal is opposite to the bureaucrat and 
he cannot stand any form of organization. His goal: destruction; his 
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T 
t(time) 
Figure 5-7. The political process in a system where the 
politician is the only actor. Y2 = 0 is 
the policy position of the politician. The 
process has a cycle T, and an amplitude R 
( 32). 
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strategy: change of the system as fast as possible to prevent any 
routinization. The anarchist is mostly active during revolutionary 
periods (32). However, Ben-Dor (11) equates anarchism to terrorism: 
"an act designed to influence political behaviour by extra-normal means 
by generating fear, uncertainty, anxiety, insecurity; the actual use of 
threat of violence." 
If the system is moving to the right, i.e., there is a rightist 
movement in progress, th~ anarchist will push it to the right and vice 
versa. 
p3 = g(dy/dt) (Eq. 5-14) 
where g is a positive constant. 
Therefore, P = P3 , and 
Therefore, a(d2y/dt2) - g(dy/dt) = 0 (Eq. 5-15) 
The solution of the above differential equation describes the 
state of S under the pressure of the anarchist as the only actor • 
. y = k1 ej t + k2 
where j = g/a. 
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(Eq. 5-16) 
(a) (b) 
y y 
t (time) t (time} 
Figure S-8. The exploding process of political 
change generated by the action of 
the anarchist: (a) the rightist 
revolution; (b) leftist. At t = 0, 
s is at Y0 = (k1 + kz) (32). 
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The system undergoes a process of exponential growth/decay 
without any limit; how fast it reaches the point of collapse depends on 
the exponent jt, since j and g are Anarchist's capabilities and 
j a: 1/ a 
as illustrated in Figure S-8. 
This brings us to the frustrated but excited citizen ·who does 
not understand the policy proposed by the politician to be implemented 
by the bureaucrat, and who, in turn has his hands full with the 
anarchist trying to undo his status quo. This person known as the 
excited citizen, or charismatic follower usually causes the emergence 
of a charismatic leader, eg., Germans supported Hitler; Chinese 
cultural revolutionaries hoisted Mao; Iranian revolutionaries recalled 
Khomeini, etc. 
The excited citizen applies P to move the system, S, away from 
the status quo, (y = 0). 
P4 = hy 
where h is a positive constant. 
Therefore, P = P4 
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Therefore, a(d2y/dt2) - hy = 0 
Solving this differential equation gives us 
where r = (h/a) exp 0.5 
as t increases, k2e-rt approaches zero; and y 
growth. 
(Eq. 5-17) 
(Eq. 5-18) 
k 1ert, an exponential 
In both cases of the anarchist and the excited citizen the 
system collapses if there is no intervention (32) Iran is a perfect 
example. 
Politician and the excited citizen are policy-oriented actors, 
while bureaucrat and anarchist are process-oriented. Politician and 
the excited citizen have opposite signs . and bureaucrat and anarchist 
have opposite signs. 
Therefore, Pz,4 = Pz + P4 = -cy + hy (Eq. 5-19) 
= (h - c)y 
= c.y (Eq. 5-19a) 
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Therefore, P1,3 = P1 + P3 = -b(dy/dt) + g(dy/dt) (Eq. 5-20) 
= (g-b)dy/dt 
= B.(dy/dt) (Eq. S-20a) 
Coefficients B and C may be positive, negative or zero, 
depending on the results of the balance of power between the bureaucrat 
and the anarchist (32). 
An external agent is any other influence which affects the 
system in a way unlike the four political actors. The political 
pressure Ps of the agent is expressed as a function of time. 
P5 = f(t) (Eq. 5-21) 
Table 5-2 describes succintly the various pressures the external 
agent can exert. 
Table 5-2. The external agent and his pressure 
Type of pressure Effect 
Ps = s a constant external pressure 
to move the system to the 
right (S ~ 0) and left (S < 0) 
Ps :::: st an escalating pressure, e.g. 
the price of a natural resource 
Ps = sent an exploding pressure 
Ps :::: s cos(nt + q) a cyclical pressure, such as 
business cycles 
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If the national policy is detrimental to the well-being of the 
majority population, the anarchist may join the excited citizen, i.e., 
Therefore, a(d2y/dt2) - g(dy/dt) - hy = 0 (Eq. 5-22) 
or y = k1(e exp (v+s)t) + k2(e exp -((v-s)t)) (Eq. 5-23) 
where s = g/2a and v = ((g2 + 4ah) exp 0.5)/2a 
Thus both the anarchist and the excited citizen contribute to 
the development of a dangerous situation since the exponential 
coefficients s and v are increasing functions of g: the capability of 
the anarchist, and h: the capability of the excited citizen. The 
system inertia, a, can slow down the decay or the exponential process 
but cannot stop it from its ultimate collapse. 
The curve demonstrates a combined growth and decay and whosoever 
is dominant, i.e., the anarchist (decay) and the excited citizen 
(growth) shall indicate cumulated decay or growth in the consequent 
period to the collapse. In more complicated systems all five actors 
may demonstrate their relative strength; a complicated pattern may 
emerge such as Lebanon after Israeli invasion of June 1982. 
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In our particular case the pattern does not develop into a 
stability situation because the decay never counterbalances the growth 
similar to post-Shah Iran. 
We have demonstrated intra-state conflict using mathematical 
models. In case the system becomes unstable when either the anarchist 
or the excited citizen, or both, bring their force(s) against the 
bureaucrat (military and civilian) and the status quo politician 
(legislators appointed by the 'executive or a parliament elected by a 
few, including rigged elections). Such examples have been found in the 
1970s: 
1. the fall of South Vietnam (1975); and 
2. the fall of the Shahinshah of Iran (1979). 
In the former case the anarchist pushed the system as fast as he 
could causing eventual collapse; and in the latter the excited citizen 
pushed the system towards his policy goal until the decay oscillated in 
his favour. 
Let us examine if such a conflict situation can develop in any 
other area of the world which bears strategic significance to the 
Western interests. 
In Chapter 6 we shall examine just such a state and try to 
understand the implications for the West and the policy that the West 
could initiate if it desires to prevent such a negative situation from 
developing. 
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6. SYNCRISIS: INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR 
Considering how many fools can calculate, it 
is surprising that it should be thought 
either a difficult or a tedious task for any 
other fool to learn how to master the same 
trick ••• What a fool can do, another can. 
Silvanus P. Thompson 
Woe to those nations who made their billions 
in oil and invested them in Western banks; 
for them time shall draw no interest. 
Anonymous 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 4 we demonstrated how information generates, grows 
and decays. The decay point after which the value of information 
depreciated beyond its usefulness was of special interest to us and we 
called this point the "half-life" of information. Similarly in Chapter 
5 we established certain mathematical models for intra-state conflict 
between warring factions, whom we classed by their attitudes, goals and 
behaviours. We saw also how their individual or collective pressures 
on the state can bring about equilibrium or collapse of the system. 
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In this chapter we shall view certain cyclic or recurring 
patterns of information, which if understood can be of great benefit to 
the technological societies of the West. The underdeveloped or 
developing societies do not have a technological base. With their 
extremely high agrarian component, they do not/will not suffer as much 
from the down-trends as a technologically sophisticated society does. 
Nevertheless, the sufferings of the latter nations should not be 
discounted because they do suffer from factors such as droughts, 
famines, floods, chronic unemployment, diseases, etc., and since they 
do not have such privileges as "talk shows" or "hot lines" to vent 
their frustration, they do exhibit certain aggression toward the 
minority in power, the politician and the bureaucrat. 
The aggressiveness of the people in these societies, or the 
Third World, is demonstrated by the severity of the above factors which 
may be cyclical due to natural causes (which are cyclical). 
TYPHOONS AND ANTI-CYCLONES 
lVhen Comrade Nikolai Kondratiev, a Soviet economist, wrote an 
article in 1926 for an obscure German magazine predicting that the 
Western capitalist economies lived out a 50- to 60-year cycle, thus 
contradicting the Marxist credo that they would crumble under their own 
weight, Stalin gave Comrade Kondratiev a short shift in the salt 
mines. Western economists were prepared to recognize 4-,S-,9-,16- and 
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22-year cycles, but a 50- to 60-year cycle was out of the question; and 
followers of Kondratiev were viewed as UFOlogists of economics (110). 
Perhaps it was a self-fulfilling prophecy that after more than 
50 years in intellectual Siberia, Comrade Kondratiev has found 
rehabilitation and respectability in no place other than at the 
Mayfair. The Society for Long Range Planners met at their headquarters 
in Belgrave Square, London, on 18 September 1981, to resurrect the 
long-wave theory of Kondratiev, and its measure of respectability can 
be gauged only by the staid British corporations' interest to establish 
long-term planning to analyze the effect of this cycle (Figure 6-1). 
There are other cycles: zunspot, housing, marriage/ divorce, 
fertility, etc., but they are too mundane for any interest at this 
juncture. However, there are cycles which demonstrate certain 
profundity towards the conduct of war or relative capability which 
arouse our interest (32,37). 
THE CYCLE OF WAR 
Doran stated a cycle of national power as a period during which 
something is established, reaches its peak and declines (37). During 
this time the nation-state is powerful enough to wage wars. 
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Figure 6-1. Kondratiev's idealized long-wave superimposed on a chart of 
US wholesale prices, reflects the ever-recurring cycle of 
inflation and deflation, or credit expansion and debt 
liquidation (110). 
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Figure 6-1. Kondratiev's idealized long-wave superimposed on a chart of 
US wholesale prices, reflects the ever-recurring cycle of 
inflation and deflation, or credit expansion and debt 
liquidation (110), 
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As the cycles evolve and role changes, significant 
adjustments are required of the government and the 
society. The theory further asserts the trauma of the 
role change is most severe for state leaders at each of 
the four critical points (Figure 5-1) on the cycle where 
an abrupt and ineluctable inversion occurs within the 
dynamics. The critical points are the two inflection 
points b and d and the two turning points a and c. It 
is at these points according to the theory that the 
government is most vulnerable to over-reaction, 
misperception, or aggravated use of force which may 
generate massive war (37). 
Figures 6-2 and 6-3 are graphic representations of relative 
capability of nine nations ( 1815-1975). The fitted curve gives the 
historic and the potential strength of each nation. With the exception 
of Japan all Western nations demonstrate decline in their relative 
capability. Each of the empirically determined relative power curves 
is supported by the historical record from 1815 through 1970 (37). 
(Some scores during the last decade appear counter-intuitive; for 
instance, the USSR apparently enjoyed 24.9 of the system's power, China 
24.7 and the US 20.0). 
New updated indicators were developed because technology: 
microelectronics and nuclear, has rendered old ones ineffective. New 
indicators were defence spending vice armed forces, and GNP per capita 
vice urbanization (37). 
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Figure 6-2. Relative power curves for major powers with data 
points and fitted curves: 1815-1975 (37). 
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Figure 6-3. Relative power curves for major powers with data 
points and fitted curves: 1815-1975 (37). 
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Comparison of the indices for China (PRC), the USSR and the US 
revealed important facts about relative power dynamics (Figure 6-4). 
1. US relative capability as measured by new data increases 
compared to the old while the Soviet and Chinese capability 
shows downward change. 
2. However, the ne\.;r data do not change the pattern of relative 
capability: US trends downwards while both Soviet and 
Chinese relative capability increase gradually. 
THE TURBOCYCLES OF VIOLENCE 
Chi ( 32) states that political violence is a normal method of 
conflict resolution in the Third \olorld nations, where the "haves" do 
not wish to give up their power and privileges and the "have-nots" 
cannot induce change through peaceful means. He expresses violence as 
a spectrwn ranging from denial of basic rights such as a decent living 
to brutal elimination of the opponents. The extreme and visible form 
of violence is assassination, "the deliberate extra-legal killing of an 
individual for political purposes". He cites assassination as his 
empirical quantifier for violence, exclusive of all other forms of 
political violence. The information was collected by searching the 
data bases of: 
1. The New York Times, 
2. Times of London, 
3. Le Honde, 
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4. Facts on file and 
5. Deadline Data. 
The targets of assassinations were limited to: 
1. heads of state or government, 
2. cabinet ministers and legislators and 
3. ranking bureaucrats: judges, generals, top civil servants. 
The number of political assassinations is counted for every 
country in Latin America, then annually aggregated to obtain an annual 
index for the whole region. To reduce the "contagion effect" of 
political violence, the moving average Yi for every two-year period was 
calculated: 
where 1,2,3 ••• i = 1918, 1919, 1920 ••• 
and Yi the number of assassinations in the ith year. 
From the above Chi (32) derives the following equation: 
(Eq. 6-1) 
(Eq. 6-2) 
He assumes the possible presence of the following political actors and 
their influences on the system. 
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Actor 
Politician 
Bureaucrat 
Anarchist 
External agent 
Factor 
Os c:l.lla tion 
Dampening 
Exploding 
Escalation/de-escalation 
Coups d'etat in Latin America have fulfilled the same process as 
elections in Western democracies (Figure 6-5). It seems that there are 
regular trends in violence followed by periods of tranquility; the 
oscillatory period (Figure 5-7) is approximately 17 years. 
By simulating various values of T (from 16 to 18 with the 
increment of 0.01), T turns out to be 16.76 years or 16 years 9 months. 
Figure 6-5 gives us the last revolutionary upsurges in Latin 
America in 1959 and 1976: Cuban and Chilean, respectively. A probable 
revolution is expected then in 1993. But we have to account for the 
fact there have been no inter-state wars, i.e., between Latin American 
countries themselves or with an outside power since the end of the 
First World War (32) or since the end of the Second World War until the 
outbreak of hos til! ties during the Falkland Islands crisis. "As a 
result of a number of treaties in the Western hemisphere there were 
never any declared wars between Latin American states in the twentieth 
century" (91). However, this trend may change after 1982 Falklands 
War, which may trigger a ripple effect. 
This raises a very interesting issue. The external agent, the 
US in this cas~ served as the damping factor (i.e. was the bureaucra~. 
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Figure 6-7. The cyclical occurrence of violence in Africa indicates a short~ning 
of the oscillatory period as well as an increase in the range of 
vi.olence with each cycle: 1919-68 (32). 
The inhibitory effect of the US was felt throughout Latin America 
regardless of the size of the state. The US was the neutral power 
exerting great influence in the guarantee of the territorial integrity 
of her southern neighbours. But with the US openly announcing support 
for the British during the Falkland Islands, the humiliating defeat and 
surrender suffered by Argentina on 15 June 1982 has added new 
imponderables. Every Latin American state is now in the process of 
refurbishing its arms inventories. Although this is being proclaimed 
as a requirement for Latin American solidarity, in reality it will lead 
to several inter-state boundary disputes specifically between: 
1. Guatemala-Belize 
2. Venezuela-Guyana 
3. Ecuador-Peru 
4. Chile-Argentina 
The entire violence equation in Latin America may have to be 
remodelled in the 1980s, with the oscillatory period, T, altered and 
shortened. 
Similarly, Chi ( 32) again has demonstrated cycles of political 
violence in Asia and Africa (Figures 6-6 and 6-7) as he considers 
parameter u in the equation (Figure 6-5) not constant, but a function 
of time. 
Although in Asia the oscillatory period shortens during each 
cycle, the range of violence remains constant as in Latin America. But 
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in Africa both the cycles are being shortened and the range of violence 
is increasing from one cycle to the other. Table 6-1 gives us the 
difference in the solving of the differential Equation 6-1. 
(Eq. 6-1) 
Table 6-1. The cycles of violence in Latin America, Asia and Africa 
Latin America Asia Africa Effect on 
MJ: constant MJ: constant MJ = m3t Range 
M4: constant M4: constant M4 = m4t Range 
u: constant u = m.ts* u = mts Cycle length t 
* s is estimated by using the simulation method to find a value which 
maximizes the best-fit between models and the observed reality. s for 
Africa= 1.00; Asia= 0.70. 
l-Ie must, therefore, conclude that the escalation of violence in 
Africa is highly probable which may push the continent or parts thereof 
into a radical systemic change. This buttresses the hypothesis to be 
advanced in this chapter that South Africa may become the probable area 
of conflict between its black majority and the white minority in 
power. Also this is the last remaining country (with the exception of 
Namibia (South West Africa) which is under South African control) where 
the natives have no rights of expression for political change through 
democratic means (votes and elections) nor other basic rights such as 
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Table 6-2. Countries that have moved away from the Western sphere of 
influence since 1945 (by continental region) (27,30,91,112) 
Decade/year Latin America Asia Africa 
1940/1949 China 
1950/1951 Guatemala (51-54) 
1954 North Vietnam 
1955 Egypt (55-77) 
1958 Iraq 
1959 Cuba 
1960/1960 Guinea 
1962 Tibet Algeria 
1963 Syria 
1964 Congo, Mali 
1967 Tanzania 
1969 Libya 
Somalia (69-77) 
1970/1970 Chile (70-73) 
1971 Sudan (71-71) 
Uganda 
1972 Madagascar 
1974 South Yemen Benin 
1975 South Vietnam Sao Tome and 
Cambodia Principe 
Laos 
1976 Angola 
Equatorial Guinea 
Cape Verde 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mozambique 
1977 Ethiopia 
1979 Nicaragua Iran 
1980/1980 Afghanistan 
1982 Mauritius 
The point of departure from the Uestern sphere is determined when 
either the nation sought ties with the Communists: USSR-Cuba or China; 
or when the US broke ties with that country. 
Parenthetical dates indicate when a nation returned to the Western 
sphere due to: 
(a) destabilization by the US in Latin America; or, 
(b) economic or military pressures by the Communists in Africa. 
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Figure 6-8. African countries which have moved away from 
Western sphere of influence ·since 1945, 
specifically since 1960 with the emergence of 
new, independent nations (7,27,30,91,112). 
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' 
decent living and humane treatment: respect of the individual, freedom 
of movement, freedom of expression, etc. 
The Latin American region will definitely pose a serious problem 
for the West, specifically for the US, where the US has lost the 
leverage and credibility in 1982. 
THE EYE OF A HURRICANE 
It is hard to keep down the man in the salt mine. Such 
reputable institutions as the MIT Alfred Sloan School of Management has 
recently come to the defence of Kondratiev•s long-wave theory. 
Kondratiev demonstrated working backwards to the eighteenth century and 
charting British, French and US wholesale prices that showed three 
peaks in 1814, 1873 and 1920. Also he found similar waves for interest 
rates. In 1968, Harvard 1 s Professor Dewey found a 54-year cycle in 
British wheat prices going back to the thirteenth century. Curiously, 
investigation of Arizona tree rings dating back to 1050 AD suggested a 
cycle of exactly the same length (110) 
The Kondratiev cycle is recognized to have peaked in 
1920. Within 10 years the subsequent "secondary 
prosperity" had run its course: bankers were throwing 
themselves out of windows and deflation and depression 
were the order of the day ••• (110). 
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The implication is that present recession is about to 
become miserable depression. Inflation could become 
deflation in the true sense, with prices falling on 
negligible demand and non-existent credit... Interest 
rates will decline, which should be good for Console and 
other gilts, but share prices will disappear below 
ground. Given past cycles the depression could last 10 
years or more (110).1 
The chairman of a trust company appeared on 10 June 1982 before 
the Canadian House of Commons finance committee investigating bank 
profits and his testimony appeared on the front page of a national 
newspaper ( 97) • 
Alan Marchment, chairman of the Guaranty Trust Company 
of Canada and chairman of the association (of Canadian 
trust companies), told the committee that a 
Depression-style calamity could overtake the country's 
economy "in six months or less" (97). 
Donald Miller, vice president of The Canada Trust 
Company, estimated a collapse could come in "under six 
months" (97). 
If this is the advice of trusted officials of the banking 
industry of a Western nation, then we will have to take another look at 
Kondratiev's theory. The Canadian dollar fell to 76.82 cents US on 23 
June 1982. This value was lower than the Depression low of 80.08 cents 
(record low) of December 1931 (Figure 6-9) (29). The prime lending 
1. This curiously may take us to 1993, the year we expect revolutionary 
action in Latin America using the model prior to Falklands war of 
1982. Also the Soviet 12-year strategic occupation cycle and the 
S-year proxy action doctrines coincide in 1992-93 (Tables 3-2 and 
3-3, respectively). 
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interest rate skyrocketed to 22.75 per cent on 06 August 1981. 
Business bankruptcies caused by exorbitant interest rates are 
phenomenally high (1,000 per month). With 65 per cent of the cash flow 
being paid as interest payment even large corporations may declare 
insolvencies thus creating an economic cataclysm. If his 54-year cycle 
is true then the repeat of 1929 is quite probable in 1983. All it will 
take for this phenomenon to become global from a local Canadian one, is 
for a debt-ridden cobalt-producing country such as Zaire (discussed 
later) or the politically-marred Poland to file for bankruptcy. This 
would also trigger a ripple effect through the Western banking syst~m, 
creditors to these countries, and their interwoven, incestuous 
relationships may cause irreversible damage to the economy of the West 
as a whole. If other debt-ridden countries follow suit and decide to 
escape their financial obligations the world may see a colossal 
paraxysm. · 
THE RAPIDLY PERISHING INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Ue have seen rather well-established trends in long-lived 
cyclical information sys terns: a single phase of 2, 100 years for the 
decay of the Egyptian civilization or a relatively short 54-year cycle 
for the Hestern economies with a down turn for as much as 10 years, 
variously called recession and depression. However, we have seen that 
after each down turn the West, especially, after the worst depression 
160 
of 1929-39 recoiled and regained its economic strength through the 
process of war (1939-45). 
He have mentioned before that the origin of a total war, which 
can only be fought in a technological environment, i.e., Europe, may be 
an escalation of a limited war. Such a war is possible if the economic 
situation becomes intolerable with energy shortages and a stranglehold 
over resources by the USSR. 
The economic threat would be so great and the civil authority so 
weak that has made one Canadian military officer to state: 
There are defence planners who suggest that deterrence 
will only be a secondary consideration to internal 
conditions when our motorized industrial (technological) 
society collapses ••• it will be military who will have 
priority on mobility: first, to defend against external 
threat, and second, to maintain the rule of law 
internally until optional approaches (for alternate 
fuels) are developed, found effective, and adopted (78). 
When a threshold of tolerance is reached, the West will have to 
decide whether it would accept an economic catastrophe: devalued 
dollar, shambled economy, fuel shortages, electric 
brown-outs/black-outs, factory shutdowns and urban disorders; or to 
.take the USSR to task. It could very well be that the USSR may decide 
to take advantage of a weakened US to assert itself in Europe, an 
industrial base for its semi-industrialized economy. In any case an 
outbreak of hostilities is possible and even probable in Europe where 
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the two superpowers have poised themselves against each other for 
almost four decades. 
The European battlefield will be a technological tit-for-tat. 
If we consider the borders of East and West Germany as the forward edge 
of the battle area (FEBA), majority of the concentrated targets would 
be within 90 km (55 miles) and more important ones within 275 km (170 
miles) from FEBA. A pre-emptive attack by the NATO forces could 
neutralize the Warsaw Pact (118). Similarly, 30 per cent of industry, 
25 per cent of the population of West Germany is 100 km (62 miles) from 
FEBA (119). 
A British scholar (94) puts the targets in Central Europe much 
closer, but he is only discussing land targets in a tank battle. 
Distance (km) 
less than 1 
1-2 
more than 2 
Target (%) 
50 
30 
20 
Total 90 
Another British general, Farrar-Hockley (43) envisions surface 
forces with sufficient launchers which could neutralize tactical air 
forces in a few days. The Canadian view is that such neutralization 
can only happen in an electronic countermeasure (ECM) free 
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environment(26). This point has been well proven in the Falklands with 
the Royal Navy and the British Army destroying a considerable number of 
Argentine tactical fighters and propeller-driven counter-insurgency 
(COIN) Pucara aircraft in a relatively ECM-free area. 
The destructive power and accuracy of modern weapons make it 
imperative for the adversaries to develop ECM and electronic 
counter-countermeasures (ECCM) capability to negate any advantage the 
enemy may think he has by launching a short-warning pre-emptive 
attack. A good example was a flight over the Baltic Sea in 1968 of a 
lone Soviet aircraft which created a cloud to baffle NATO ECM; and soon 
thereafter the entire t~arsaw Pact theatre was hidden from the NATO 
radar network. When a second such incident occurred in August, 1968, 
the Soviet armed forces invaded Czechoslovakia, without an inkling to 
the West of a massive military movement. 
INFORMATION WARFARE ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL BATTLEFIELD 
The Charge of the Light Brigade, the Battle of Waterloo, the 
naval engagement off Jutland, the Argentine attack on Falklands, etc., 
are examples of poor c3r. Such errors frustrate battlefield or 
tactical commanders and can lead to the loss of the battle itself. But 
all this has changed due to scientific research in information transfer 
and technological developments, and their operational or war 
applicat.ion on the battlefield. 
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Detection is synonymous with destruction, states a Canadian 
officer (78). l~ith fire-and-forget surface-to-surface missiles working 
on thermal-signature or heat-seeking mode, remaining hidden on the 
battlefield becomes more and more difficult. If there is a war in 
Europe the technological attrition will be immense with all the systems 
and countersystems prevalent on the battlefield. It will be difficult 
to determine the victor from the vanquished. 
Appendix C discusses the West's capability to control and 
disseminate information on the battlefield. Let us see if t~e USSR has 
such technology. lie discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the F-104 
Starfighter being the most superior aircraft in the world in the 
1960s. We also mentioned that it was the mainstay of the Pakistan Air 
Force in the wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Although it proved its 
technological superiority in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, something else 
happened to this technology in 1971. 
During the last Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, 
Indian strike aircraft repeatedly succeeded in making 
low-level penetration of up to 160 km ( 100 miles) into 
Pakistani air space. Flying at night, they repeatedly 
located and attacked their targets with great 
precision. In addition to aircraft specially (sic) 
suited to this strike role such as Su-7s and Canberras, 
the Inadian Air Force also used An-12 military transport 
aircraft converted into bombers which dropped palletized 
bomb loads of up to 16t from their rear loading ramps 
haphazardly over populated areas. These aircraft 
generally took off from their base at Chandigarh, 230 km 
( 140 miles) north of Delhi, to attack targets in the 
Sialkot, Gujranwala, Lahore, Lyallpur, and Multan areas 
(31). 
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Figure 6-10. As early as 1971, during the Indo-Pakistan 
war, a Moss aircraft flown by a Soviet 
crew served as the Indian early-warning 
and control centre. Strike aircraft of 
the Indian Air Force were guided by Tu-114 
Moss to targets up to 185 km behind 
Pakistani lines. The Moss itself remained 
a safe distance away from the Pakistani 
border, over Indian terri tory at an 
altitude of 6000 m and under the cover of 
Indian SAM defences. The strike aircraft 
(in addition to Canberra and Su-7 included 
An-12 Cup transport converted into 
bombers) operated from their base at 
Chandigarh, 230 km north of Delhi (31). 
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Figure 6-11. Tu-114 Moss, the Soviet early-warning aircraft 
operationally tested by the USSR in the 
India-Pakistan war of 1971, a decade ahead of its 
counter-threat, the US E-2C's active test during the 
Israeli-Syrian air battles in Lebanon in 1982 (31). 
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The Pakistani air defence ••• could not manage to 
effectively counter these repeated night penetrations by 
the Indian aircraft. They did, however, confirm the 
presence during each of these attacks of a lone aircraft 
flying at an altitude of 6,000 m (20,000 ft) always a 
safe distance from the Pakistan border, under the cover 
of Indian SAM defenses, and this was eventually given 
the designation Spider. Pakistani communications 
intelligence (COMINT) staff claimed that all the 
operators on board the aircraft, including the Indian 
radio officer, spoke Russian. The Pakistanis also 
confirmed the extremely effective ECM of this single 
aircraft. At this point, it should have become clear to 
~-Testern observers that the Russians counterpart of the 
American AWACS had successfully passed its operational 
evaluation under combat conditions (31) (Figure 6-10). 
The initial phase of the Israel-Syrian-Lebanese affray was a 
test of information science, technology and war. The Israelis using 
the E-2C Hawkeye aircraft (Appendix C) were able to engage both the 
Syrian aircraft in dogfights as well as evade, retrieve and destroy 
Syrian interlocking SAM network in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. 
Israel's success in tank and air battles against 
Soviet-made weapons during the fighting in Lebanon has 
major implications for Warsaw Pact and NATO planners, 
military sources said yesterday. 
During the five days of fierce clashes last week, both 
the Israelis and Syrians tested new weapons and new 
technology for the first time in battle conditions. 
The Israeli Air Force was guided by Hawkeye radar 
surveillance aircraft, which were said to be capable of 
tracking 250 planes simultaneously ••• (49). 
So the Pakistani Air Force US-built F-104 became the target of a 
superior Soviet technology (the threat) and the Syrian Soviet-built MiG 
aircraft to the US computer-technology (the counterthreat) and the 
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dialectics of technological innovations and the strategic thinking we 
discussed in Chapter 3 prevailed. 
The crux of technological change lies in the technologies of 
information, interacting with and amplifying the effectiveness of other 
technologies. In Chapter 3 we had discussed the Joint Tactical 
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and its instant information 
transfer capability to provide the tactical commander up-to-the-moment 
information. (The development of the system is detailed in Appendix 
"C"). In Chapter 4 we established the information decay models. Now 
we would like to see if these models apply in a real situation. 
Succintly the epoch of (JTIDS) information on a battlefield is 12.8 
minutes, and the half-life of such information is much less as the 
information starts decaying as the threat becomes ominously large with 
every passing second. The half-life of such information then is two 
minutes (Figure 6-12). This signifies that the tactical commander has 
less than that to negate the threat, by launching his counterthreat. 
Let us hope that men of vision foresee events before the threats and 
counterthreats become so large that lest someone will say "may the best 
information system win." 
The rapidly perishing information on the technological 
battlefield (Figure 6-12) demonstrates a curious similarity to the 
information decay upon publication (Figure 4-4) such that in both cases 
information value perishes rather quickly. In the case of battlefield 
information Figure 6-12 only projects a single item of information. 
However, myriads of such items of information are being generated in 
each 7. 8125 milliseconds-time-slot and each of these may last a 12 
168 
,-... 
C/l 
~ 
•r-i 
l=l 
;::l 
E-i 
~~ G 
:I:l co 
E-1 H 
·~ 
•r-i 
,.c 
H 
co ~-- HALF-LIFE 
'-' 
t (minutes) 
Figure 6-12. Rapidly decaying information during 
a technological air battle. 
169 
second cycle or 12.8-minute epoch. This brings us to an interesting 
point of supersession of information (Figures 4-1, 6-5, 6-6, and 6-7). 
In the first figure we see information mounting in a single phase. The 
latter figures demonstrate cycles of repetition or waves, similar to 
air battles where a threat appears in waves (or force) and decays when 
challenged by counterthreat. 
Thus we have established that battlefield information behaves in 
the same manner as the scientific information or information collected 
during peace time. The only difference in these two cases is that 
decay is compressed by the environment variable, time, during war. 
Consider an information source that broadcasts once every 
epoch. The storage channel receives the message and stores it until it 
is updated at the corresponding point in the next epoch. This is 
similar to Grum' s idea of periodic replenishment of information (55). 
In terms of the storage channel which holds the message perhaps for up 
to 12.8 minutes, we can explicitly apply the notion of half-life or 50 
per cent usage of the information. However, in these cases of 
life-critical but exceedingly ephemeral information we can extend the 
discard point to more than one half-life, which we have established at 
2 minutes. If we use two half-lives, we expend 75 per cent of 
information (Table 4-6). In Table 6-3 we elaborate this usage. 
Table 6-3. Half-lives versus information utility 
Number of Time Information Remaining 
half-lives (minutes) decay (%) information (%) 
1 2 50 50 
2 4 75 25 
3 6 87.5 12.5 
4 8 93.75 6.25 
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cent. 
After 8 minutes the information has been degraded 93.75 per 
Since the storage channel retains this information for 12.8 
minutes, i.e. 6.25 per cent of information for one-third of the period, 
it suggests that this time is being wasted on information that is 
already consumed or whose youthfulness has been expended. In a fast 
changing environment having no information is maybe better than having 
misleading information. 
If old information is unreliable one is fooling oneself by 
maintaining it: "You don't know, but you don't know, that you don't 
know." 
The storage channel can be more effectively utilized by dropping 
the information and storing other material. In fact if we have three 
channels by staggering them by two half-lives, i.e., every four 
minutes, one channel is not utilized one-third of the time. This gives 
us the equivalent of one additional channel, or four channels for the 
price of three. If six channels are to be established then the 
turnover of information can be six-fold, the present storage channel. 
This suggestion should be researched in the ever-expanding information 
world. 
APART SKIN, APART HIDE 
In Chapter 5 we discussed in detail the multi-actor scenario and 
their orientation towards equilibrium or destabilization of a state; 
and the rationale for limited war by the big powers. Let us see if the 
rationale and models apply in a real situation. 
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Suppose we examine a state which has a multi-actor scenario and 
the ingredients which could create an environment for a conflict 
situation or may already have reached that state without our apparent 
(public) knowledge. Also we have to assume this state is of crucial or 
strategic importance to the West such that the West would not hesitate 
to apply the doctrine of limited warfare should the situation warrant. 
Let us assume the state to be the Republic of South Africa. The 
reason for choosing South Africa is important not because it is an 
isolated technologically-oriented state, but because the West 1 s 
(specifically the US) dependence on the raw material and natural 
resources it produces. According to various South African public 
documents (115,116) that country is the largest producer of strategic 
minerals listed in Table 6-4. 
Table 6-4. South African strategic minerals* (partial list) 
Mineral World reserves (%) Rank West 1 s reserves (%) Rank 
Manganese 78 1 93 1 
Chromium 81 1 84 1 
Platinum 75 1 89 1 
Gold 51 1 64 1 
Cobalt 4 6 6 5 
* Figures vary when obtained from different South African institutions 
because of secret trades and trade secrets. 
According to Canadian economic geologist, W.N. Tupper, the US 
created a stockpile of strategic minerals after the Second World War. 
But if imports of strategic minerals from South Africa were to be 
terminated, the US would be in serious trouble within 3 to 5 years. 
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South Africa has technical problems in the transportation of its raw 
materials as well. In 1981 South Africa produced a record crop of 
maize (corn). Of the 7 million tons earmarked for export, the railways 
could only move 3 million tons. If the railways deteriorate by 20 per 
cent, it could pose a serious threat to the long-range technological 
well-being of the West (122). The minerals the US is most dependent 
upon from South Africa are: chromite, manganese and platinum. (Cobalt 
comes from Zaire, a country which has serious financial problems). 
Chromite is used in variable quantities up to 40 per cent in the 
manufacture of steel, primarily to give it (122): 
1. toughness: 
2. strength: 
3. resistance: 
the ability to withstand impact; 
the ability to withstand load; and 
the abiltity to inhibit corrosion. 
Manganese is also used in the manufacture of steel: 20-22 lb of 
manganese is used as a scavenger per ton of steel to give it strength 
and remove brittleness (122). Platinum is used for processing 
ultra-caustic acids: sulphuric, hydrochloric, hydrofluoric (122), and 
phosphoric ( 2). Platinum can also be used as a catalyst in the 
electrolysis process to produce hydrogen (from water) as a fuel, a 
trend away from hydrocarbons. There are still other uses under 
research for platinum, depending upon its continued availability (2). 
Gold has no strategic value insofar as defence is concerned, but 
whosoever controls this noble metal can surely bankrupt the ~lest in a 
very short period. After all the US was the country which had based 
its economy on cheap gold ($35.00 per ounce) and cheaper oil until 1971 
and 1973, respectively. 
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South Africa is also the only country in the world which 
transforms coal into oil, a process perfected by Hitler's Germany. It 
has two plants in operation, SASOL I and II, 120 miles from 
Johannesburg, and SASOL III is being constructed nearby by the US. All 
three plants are close together near the coal mines (122). 
We have information provided by science on South Africa's 
potential as a supplier of strategic minerals to the US and the Western 
nations. 
Let us assume that South Africa is a state with three-actor 
scenario: 
A1 = black majority 
A2 = white minority in power; and 
A3 = coloured (mixed) race, Asians and individuals of moderate 
views. 
Let us also assume that A2, the white South African government, 
due to logic intrinsic to itself proposes a policy of universal 
sterilization of the majority black, A1, or some other reprehensive and 
unpopular scheme to radicalize black position. The black citizenry 
assumes a policy position Y1 on the extreme left of the issue continuum 
(Figure 5-l) and opposes the rightist policy at Y2• 
The politician asks the bureaucrat to implement the policy. The 
citizen becomes excited and is joined by the anarchist whose only aim 
is to destabilize the system and push it out of equilibrium. Internal 
strife becomes an intra-state war with the alignment of the forces of 
the bureaucrat and the politician P1 and P2 and those of the anarchist 
and the excited citizen P3 and P4 since the blacks have no experience 
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in politics or bureaucracy due to white minority policy. 
We have P3 and P4 together as 
y = k1e exp ((v+s)t) + k2e exp -((v-s)t) (Eq. 5-23) 
where s = g/a; v = ((g2 + 4ah) exp 0.5))/2a 
The government of the unpopular white minority may collapse, 
such as that of the Shahinshah of Iran, when it implemented the policy 
to curtail the traditional salary to the religious leaders (the 
mullahs). They in turn excited the citizens and Khomeini emerged as a 
charismatic leader. Similarly, the combined forces of the excited 
citizen and the anarchist can bring down the system. According to 
information cycles, (Figure 6-7), the violence in Africa is increasing 
with both the oscillatory period and the range of violence becoming 
shorter and more intense respectively (Table 6-1). 
We have both the cyclical information about Africa and the 
information about the dynamic forces within South Africa, which are 
diametrically opposed to each others' views. In an environment like 
this, when colonialism has disappeared from the world in general and 
Africa in particular, South Africa becomes an anomaly and an 
anachronism. 
In the case of South Africa information science can save the 
day, if the West realizes that the decay can be arrested before it 
gains momentum. From Toynbee's work (48) and Doran's relative 
power curves (Figures 6-2 and 6-3) we know that once the decay process 
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begins the capability of the state never returns to its former zenith. 
Historically we have seen Egyptian, Greek, Roman empires collapse. In 
the twentieth century the Ottoman (Turkish), British and the French 
empires have crumbled and the superpowers have emerged. So it is quite 
feasible for South Africa to become the next Vietnam, Crimean war or 
the Waterloo, Dienbienphu, Bangladesh for the West. 
If the West persists in ignoring the aspirations of the black 
majority of South Africa, it will have to wake up to the realities of 
the day, the hour, the moment. The t-Test must reinforce the forces 
which will bring progressive change and establish equilibrium in South 
Africa to guarantee a continued supply of strategic minerals for its 
technological well-being and to maintain its relative capability. 
If the South African minority white government collapses by the 
combined actions of the anarchist and the excited citizen, the US will 
have two choices, both quite unfavourable. 
1. Invoke the third precept learned by the US in the 
implementation of the doctrine of limited warfare, i.e., no 
regime which cannot defend itself against a revolution or 
subversion can be helped through intervention (96) and lose 
South Africa as it did Iran, which would mean the US would 
lose its only source for strategic minerals. 
2. Defend the South African government to negate the combined 
actions of the anarchist and the excited citizen which can 
have two outcomes: 
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a. A win for South Africa would give the US a breathing 
spell, such as the one for 27 years in Iran after 
reinstalling the overthrown Shah in 1952. 
b. A loss under this circumstance would mean a total 
write-off of strategic minerals to a nation which can 
either be: 
( i) hostile, non-aligned and heedless to international 
pressures, or 
(ii) hostile, aligned with the USSR similar to Cuba, 
Ethiopia, Libya, determined to undo the US at all 
costs. 
If the latter occurs (i.e., 2.b.(ii)) we come to a new set of 
choices. 
1. Accept the loss gracefully of the source of natural resources 
and look for new technology to provide for the deficiency. 
The geological adage "what is ore today may not be ore 
tomorrow and vice versa", can have many interpretations. 
a. Substitution technology, or where technology has prevailed 
in finding replacements for many strategic minerals (122): 
(i) artificial diamonds for industrial use; 
( ii) silica-carbide (carborundum) for cutting steel and 
concrete; 
(iii) artificial cryolite as flux in the electrolysis 
process for the manufacture of aluminum vice the 
real mineral only found in Greenland; and 
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(iv) nepoleine vice feldspar as raw material for the 
manufacture of whiteware, 
may prevail again in finding new and better substitutions 
for future uses. 
b. Advancing technology, or when low grade material can be 
mined profitably such as (122): 
(i) copper being mined from material with less than 0.4 
per cent cupric content, same is true of molybdenum; 
and 
( ii) nickel being mined with 100 per cent increase in 
extraction from Latrite or nickel-bearing soil (1.2 
per cent) instead of nickel sulphide (0.6 per cent) 
since 1977. 
c. Developing technology, such as new methods of extracting 
fuels and minerals (122): 
(i) petroleum from shale and oil sands; and 
(ii) marine mining as there are sufficient manganese 
nodules on the ocean floor (the reason why Law of 
the Sea is essential). 
2. If the West does not wish to accept the loss of South Africa 
to a hostile populace with the 
choice is to fight the USSR or 
Soviet backing, then the 
the Soviet policy would 
further destabilize the economy of the West in general and 
the US in particular. 
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If the economic situation is considered bad after the 1982 
Versailles summit of the seven most industrialized nations of the 
world, with 30 million unemployed in the OECD countries, what would the 
scenario be without the availability of strategic minerals for the West 
and in particular the US? 
The prospects for one giant step to the moon, or even Io, may be 
the means to the end of a rainbow. 
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7. "PER ARDUA AD ASTRA"! 
HIGH FLIGHT 
Oh! I have slipped the surly bonds of earth 
And danced the skies on laughter-silvered wings; 
Sunward I've climbed, and joined the tumbling mirth 
Of sun-split clouds - and done a hundred things 
You have not dreamed of - wheeled and soared and swung 
High in the sunlit silence. Hov'ring there 
I've chased the shouting wind along, and flung 
My eager craft through footless halls of air. 
Up, up the long, delicious, burning blue 
I've topped the windswept heights with easy grace 
Where never lark, nor even eagle flew -
And, while with silent lifting mind I've trod 
The high untrespassed sanctity of space 
Put out my hand and touched the face of God. 
Pilot Officer John J. McGee, Jr.2 
Royal Canadian Air Force 
1. "Through difficulties to the stars", motto of the RCAF 01 April 1924 
to 31 January 1968 and the Canadian Forces Air Operations Branch 
(air force) since December 1972. Also the motto of RAF, RAAF, 
RNZAF, etc. 
2. A US citizen, born in China, educated in Britain, terminated his 
studies at Yale to serve as a Spitfire pilot; composed the sonnet in 
September 1941. The sonnet was scribbled on the back of an envelope 
addressed to his mother and was found after he was killed on active 
service 11 December 1941. 
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The complexity in attaining the objectives of this thesis was 
considerable as information science is a relatively new discipline and 
this is the first known effort to see the ephemerality of information 
in the fields of technology and war. In that respect a novel approach 
dissecting several hard and soft sciences as well as history, and 
mathematics was necessary. In a roundabout way, we have thus proven 
that information science is both inter- and multidisciplinary. 
Our research involved such physical sciences as physics, 
chemistry and geology; and social sciences: sociology, economics, 
international relations, political science, etc., with syncretic 
elements from various other fields. Data had to be collected and 
retrieved from sundry sources as data bases themselves do not indicate 
any storage on half-life of information. The construction of the 
thesis was even more difficult especially in trying to coalesce various 
rliscrete elements. 
We have concluded that technology is changing rapidly, affecting 
information to an extent that every change in technology becomes a 
change in information such that technology becomes, in a sense, 
information itself. Also we have found that technological innovation 
is the driving force in moulding strategic thinking or war. The 
relationship between technology and war we concluded is so close that 
every change in technology brings about a change in strategic doctrine 
of war. Thus technology becomes synonymous with war and through 
implication, with information. 
Our major conclusion has been that information perishing or 
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decay is inevitable and is a depreciating function of time; and that 
information perishes at different rates in different fields and the 
faster the rate of information growth, the speedier is the decay of 
such information. The decay differs from radioactive decay only in the 
fact that information becomes unused and not unusable. 
We established a threshold of information usefulness as the 
point when 50 per cent of the information is utilized; or when half of 
the total information has depreciated or perished; or when half of the 
total use of information has been made. And we stated this point to be 
the half-life of information. 
We applied the decay syndrome to other information systems to 
test its application. Empirical research showed us systems with decay 
ranging from 2,100 years for ancient civilizations to less than 2 
minutes for not very civilized action in a technological war. We also 
found long-range decay of political systems and the effect such a decay 
would have on the t.Jestern civilization if corrective actions are not 
implemented. As a by-product of the research we also discovered 
patterns in other systems which can be understood as the subtle 
workings of cyclic occurrences on global scale, especially the Dmminent 
economic cataclysm expected in 1983. 
Finally, and most importantly, we have established that 
information science provides a novel, new and different approach to 
many of the problems facing the world. The role of the information 
scientist is as a theorist for the decision-maker, not just to "examine 
the way scientists use scientific information" (35). 
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Appendix 'A' 
FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ROLES AND MISSIONS 
This is a short description of the various types of missions in 
air-to-air and air-to-surface operational roles undertaken by fighter 
aircraft (38,123) 
AIR-TO-AIR 
1. Air Intercept. The rapid dispatching ("scrambling") of 
interceptor aircraft in all-weather, day-night conditions under the 
direction of ground control radars to within a range from an airborne 
intruder from which the interceptor can assume control and approach, 
identify and when necessary destroy the intruder. The approach, 
identification and manoeuvre to within the launch envelope of onboard 
weapons is performed by means of the interceptor's multi-mode radar, 
the infra-red search-and-track system as well as other onboard 
sensors. To permit the interceptor a degree of freedom to employ a 
variety of tactics, the aircraft radar must have long-range capability 
to sweep a large airspace. To take advantage of long-range detection 
of hostile targets the aircraft must carry long- or medium-range 
air-to-air armaments and, to engage targets detected by shorter-range 
sensors, additional short-range air-to-air weapons (missiles and 
rapid-fire cannon) must be available. The interceptor must be capable 
of quick reaction, high maximum airspeed at altitude and a radius of 
action which would enable interception of hostile aircraft while still 
within surveillance radar coverage. 
2. Defensive Counter-air. Conducted to destroy or neutralize the 
enemy's offensive air capabilities, thereby permitting the effective 
use of the air by friendly forces while denying it to the enemy. 
Defensive operations are conducted at the initiative of the enemy and 
include the engagement of hostile aircraft penetrating friendly 
airspace and the defence of friendly surface targets of any type 
against attack by enemy air resources. Agility in air combat, usually 
expressed in terms of excess energy and manoeuvrability under given 
parameters of altitude, airspeed and "g" force, are measurements of an 
aircraft's capability in defensive counter-air operations. To engage 
enemy aircraft the tactical fighter must have a suitable air-to-air 
radar and other target acquisition aids in order to utilize its long-, 
medium- and short-range missiles and its rapid-fire cannon. Suitable 
threat-warning equipment is also required. 
AIR-TO-SURFACE 
1. Interdiction. An offensive air support mission carried out 
against enemy surface targets to isolate or seal off an area, denying 
the use of a route or approach, or destroying and neutralizing the 
enemy's military potential at a distance behind the forward edge of the 
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battle area (FEBA). Battlefield Interdiction, a relatively new term, 
is an interdiction mission carried out within 50 miles of FEBA. These 
tactical aircraft normally carry a maximum of air-to-ground munitions: 
either bombs, guided bombs, rockets or guided missiles or all of the 
above, and if attacked they are extremely vulnerable due to the 
weight-and-drag penalties of these weapons. Therefore, adequate 
threat-warning systems are required to alert of possible attack by 
enemy aircraft or ground-based air defence systems. After cruising at 
high level for fuel economy to FEBA, high-speed penetration to the 
target area is at high-, medium-, or low-level depending on the type of 
enemy defences anticipated. In case of attack by enemy aircraft, the 
interdiction aircraft must also be equipped with defensive armament 
such as a rapid-fire cannon and air-to-air missiles. 
2. Close-air Support. The application for airborne weapons against 
hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly land forces, 
and requires the detailed integration of each air mission with the 
firepower and movement plans of those forces. As this mission is 
normally in support of friendly forces in contact with the enemy, to be 
fully effective maximum ordnance must be brought to bear as accurately 
as possible in minimum time. Thus the tactical aircraft must carry a 
large weapons payload, react quickly, cruise at high speed to the 
target area, have adequate target acquisition aids to permit rapid and 
accurate location of the target and have the ability to accurately 
deliver either unguided or guided weapons. In support of pre-planned 
friendly land offensive, the tactical fighter must be capable of 
loitering short of the target area so that its firepower can be 
immediately brought to bear at the most advantageous time. Moreover, 
when operating in such close proximity to ground-based air defence 
systems, adequate warning and countermeasures systems must be carried. 
3. Offensive Counter-air. Conducted to destroy or neutralize the 
enemy's offensive and defensive air capabilities thereby permitting the 
effective ·use of the air by friendly forces while denying it to the 
enemy. Offensive operations are conducted at the initiative of 
friendly forces and include the at tack on airfields, aircraft on the 
ground or in the air and the associated support and logistics of enemy 
air operations. These targets could be located deep within enemy 
territory thereby requiring the tactical aircraft to possess the 
inherent capability to penetrate these distances at high speeds and low 
altitudes. To penetrate enemy airspace the tactical fighter must 
carry, in addition to its offensive weapons payload of bombs, rockets 
and air-to-ground missiles, threat-warning systems so as to be alerted 
of possible attack by enemy air defence missiles and aircraft, and 
sufficient defence in the form of rapid-fire cannon and air-to-air 
missiles, should such an attack occur. 
4. Defence Suppression. Suppressing enemy's counter-air system to 
degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy's surface air defences and 
command, control and communications (c3) systems, so that friendly air 
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forces can operate with greater flexibility and reduced losses. 
aircraft with such a capability (F-4 Phantom) is known as a 
weasel". 
The 
"wild 
5. Anti-maritime Surface. Operations extending beyond the land 
mass to the limit of the territorial waters. When necessary, the 
effective application of firepower against maritime surface targets, 
whether to enforce control or destroy, can best be carried out by 
tactical aircraft because of their quick reaction capabilities and 
their capability to carry a variety of armaments. From on-shore bases, 
the tactical fighter can dash at high altitude and speed before 
descending to the target area. A radius of action sufficient to allow 
protection of all territorial waters when operating from main or 
dispersed operating bases is a measure of the effectiveness of the 
aircraft in this mission. The latest generation of long-range pulse 
doppler look-down radars permits early target acquisition, while guided 
air-to-surface missiles provide an attack capability outside the lethal 
zone of ship defence sys terns. However, to remain clear or warn of 
penetration of this zone, the attacking aircraft must also be equipped 
with the appropriate threat-warning systems. When flown in conjunction 
with naval task force the mission is called tactical air support 
maritime operation (TASMO). 
6. Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Employment of tactical 
aircraft carrying one or more types of sensors to acquire intelligence 
information on enemy targets or territories for offensive or defensive 
planning or post-operation assessment of attack effectiveness. To 
provide the high resolution data and thus the detailed information. 
necessary, aircraft normally penetrate the enemy airspace at altitudes 
of less than 500 feet above ground level (AGL). Low altitudes and high 
speeds combined with onboard warning systems and defensive armaments 
are necessary to enhance survivability when operating in close 
proximity to enemy's air defence system. The aircraft must have 
sufficient radius of action to enable a high-speed penetration from 
FEBA deep into enemy territory. 
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Appendix 'B' 
BRITISH ABANDONMENT OF HYDERABAD DECCAN (1947-48) 
The Dominion of Hyderabad Deccan (Figure B-1), a suzerain 
nation, (Crown under a Crownd with a population of 17 million1 and an 
area of 82,700 square miles , was abandoned by Britain in 1947-48 in 
spite of a "Perpetual and General Defensive Alliance" of 1800 (65). In 
1766 the Nizam had ceded the coastal districts of Northern Circars (33) 
and in 1853 the province of Berar was assigned to the British (on their 
own behest) for stationing troops in Hyderabad and the area was ceded 
to British rule in 1902 (33). Several attempts to regain control over 
Berar were dismissed by Britain, including court proceedings, which the 
British government did not allow citing that a suzerain nation cannot 
sue a sovereign nation. 
In August 1947, when the British granted independence to India 
and Pakistan, Hyderabad Deccan opted for independence within the 
British Commonwealth of Nations. The letters of the king of Hyderabad 
Deccan, Nizam VII, the richest man in the world at that time, to 
King George VI, were never transmitted by the Viceroy and Governor-
General of India, Lord Louis Mount batten ( 69). Nine months later 
Mountbatten replied to the Nizam: 
I have investigated the matter, and it appears that the 
reason why a further reply was not sent lay in an error 
of staff work in the political department here ••• (69). 
The Nizam of Hyderabad Deccan, who had assisted the British in 
the two World lolars with men, money and material, and on whom they had 
bestowed the title of His Exalted Highness, the Faithful Ally, was 
abandoned to the Indian economic blockade and military pressure (79). 
lolhile Hyderabad Deccan fought its case before the UN in 1948, Indian 
forces advanced on the state from 20 different fronts and Hyderabad 
armed forces capitulated on 17 September 1948 (65). 
About this, a former British Resident (Crown's representative) 
at Hyderabad Deccan, Sir Arthur Cunningham Lothian has written (79): 
No person of British origin who knows the facts can read 
this dignified and loyal statement (of Nizam) without 
the feeling of shame at our tacit abandonment of 
Hyderabad to pressure of every sort from India... The 
parallel between recent events in Hyderabad and what 
happened in Czecho-Slovakia (sic) before the last War 
must surely have occurred to everyone acquainted with 
\'lhat has transpired (79). 
1. Canada had a population of 12.9 million in 1948 (24.6 in 1982 
(Statistics Canada)). 
2. Twice the size of Ireland; half that of France (69,79). 
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Figure B-1. His Exalted Highness the Nizam' s Dominion of Hyderabad 
Deccan: population 17 million; area 82,700 square miles; 
own currency; railways; airline; armed forces. Abandoned 
by the British in 1947-48 to Indian economic blockade and 
consequent military invasion, while the country was 
fighting before the UN for the return of the territory 
taken away by Britain in lieu of protection, which never 
came when it was needed (65). 
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The Nizam, in his last letter to Mountbatten, wrote: 
To break fa! th with the weak causes perhaps less 
immediate disadvantage than to break faith with the 
strong, but assuredly it brings its retribution (69). 
He never received any reply. About 850,000 people were killed, 
millions became destitute, homeless refugees. No British flotilla came 
to the aid of their faithful ally, for he had stopped serving their 
majestic interests. 
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Appendix 'C' 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION: 
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Alexander Graham Bell, a Canadian, inventor of the telephone, 
made his first analog transmission in 1874 using circuit-switched 
network with fixed bandwidth pre-allocated for the duration of the 
call. Prior to the 1960s pre-allocation was considered an "in" thing 
(105). 
Some time in the 1960s the USAF commissioned the RAND 
Corporation to study the possibility of a survivable communications 
system containing no central components. In August 1964 the report was 
submitted to the USAF, which shelved the study for several years. RAND 
Corporation proposed something which had been known for some time, but 
considered uneconomical. Dynamic-allocated concept never attempts to 
schedule a bandwidth over the entire source-to-destination path. There 
is a space after each link of the message or packet. Thus 
packet-switching was born. It divides the input into minute segments 
(packets) at immense speed and is three to 100 times more efficient 
than a pre-allocated system (105) which the enemy is able to intercept 
(messages from the front). 
Computer professionals re-discovered packet-switching in 
response to communicating data from computer-to-computer. Licklider, 
in the mid-1960s developed the time-sharing computer system called 
ARPA I at MIT. In 1968 ARPANET packet-switching network was given the 
go-ahead (105). Since then there has been no looking back on the 
system (science) and its applications (technology). 
Packet radio using one wide-band channel was developed 
transmitting short bursts when there was data to transmit. Voice 
transmission via packet-switching is being developed and digitized 
voice can be compressed 15 times (105) thus making the "scrambler" used 
in military communications, redundant. 
There are several other uses of packet-switched information 
networks but the most significant ?re those used by ARPANET for world 
climate study, the Space Shuttle and command, control and communication 
(c3) for the worldwide military command and communications system 
(lo/WMCCS) ( 76) and broadcast communications satellites with a unique 
potential to support packet communication efficiently even with the 
limitation of 0.25-second round-trip to the geostationary satellites 
(61) approximately 23 million miles away in space. 
Since there are several subscribers or users to a system, they 
share it in a unique time-division multiple-access (TDMA) manner, with 
data from each station segmented into bursts of time shared at 
specified moments (61). The University of Hawaii's Project Aloha in 
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the 1970s indicated the utilization of packet radio to be feasible and 
effective. The primary objective of such an information network was 
the support of interactive communications between the computer resource 
(host) connected to the network and user terminal (terminal-host, 
host-host, terminal-terminal) (68) thus maintaining integrity even if 
one component is destroyed. 
The wide-band spread spectrum, although desirable, is not a 
priori requirement. Coded-slotted information transfer can provide an 
effective ECCM capability with a very low probability of intercept (68) 
as the enemy would not knm" which bandwidth is being used at a specific 
instant. 
This information system can be used in airborne, seaborne, 
ground or space environment. The science's technological embodiment 
came when the information system was fitted into an aircraft, and the 
war embodiment, when the aircraft was used as a surveillance/C3 system 
to control tactical fighters in their air-to-air and air-to-surface 
roles (Appendix A). 
Joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) operates 
a sii1gle secure communications channel that is divided into 128 time 
slots per second. Each participant is alloted enough time slots to 
meet his needs. An E-2C Hawkeye (Figure C-1) or E-3A Sentry (Figure 
C-2) aircraft are given slots to report the position, speed, heading, 
identity, etc., of all aircraft they are capable of tracking (17). 
Participant communication capacity and reporting rates 
can be traded off to determine the overall system 
performance. Individual access to the system may be as 
infrequent as once each 12.8 minutes or as often as once 
each 8 milliseconds. The number of participants in a 
single JTIDS network may range from 2 to 98,000 ••• (17). 
The system works by sending first a synchronization burst 
followed by a message containing several hundred bits of digital 
information. A guard period follows allowing the information to 
propagate throughout the environment. This "time-slot" lasts 7.8125 
milliseconds, and 1, 536 time-slots make a "cycle"; and 64 such frames 
constitute an "epoch". At this point, the time-slots are renumbered 
and a new epoch begins (17) (Figure C-3). 
An E-3A Sentry aircraft (Figure C-2) for airborne warning and 
control system (AWACS) or airborne early warning (AEW) for European 
theatre has sophisticated radars to detect and track low-flying hostile 
aircraft and can vector interceptors to engage the intruders before 
conventional radars can pick them up. It can also monitor the 
marshalling of aircraft at enemy bases behind enemy lines and command 
friendly aircraft in a pre-emptive attack (17). 
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The E-3A can provide information to ground and naval tactical 
commanders and assist these forces from detection by enemy radar over a 
large area (Figure C-4) through timely information from their evasive 
action period. NATO has ordered 18 E-3A Sentry aircraft; UK has 11 AEW 
Nimrod aircraft to supplement their NATO commitment (53). Saudi Arabia 
will receive five such aircraft in the mid-1980s. The Soviet 
counterpart, Tu-114 Moss is illustrated in Figure 6-11 (31). 
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E-2C Hawkeye all-weather carrier-borne early-warning 
aircraft. Also suitable for land-based operations 
with a detection range of 260 nm (300 miles) at 30,000 
ft. In service with the USN and the Israeli Air 
Force. Eight aircraft ordered for Japan (1982-85) and 
four will be delivered to Egypt. 
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Figure C-1. E-2C Hawkeye all-weather carrier-borne early-warning 
aircraft. Also suitable for land-based operations 
with a detection range of 260 nm (300 miles) at 30,000 
ft. In service with the USN and the Israeli Air 
Force. Eight aircraft ordered for Japan (1982-85) and 
four will be delivered to Egypt. 
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Figure C-2. E-3A Sentry (Boeing 707) airborne warning and control 
system (AWACS) aircraft for CONUS and Canada; and 
airborne early-warning (AEW) aircraft for NATO. A 
total of 31 aircraft are planned for continental air 
defence and 18 for Europe; 5 will be delivered to Saudi 
Arabia (7 were scheduled for Iran in 1979-80) (53). 
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Figure C-2. E-3A Sentry (Boeing 707) airborne warning and control 
system (AWACS) aircraft for CONUS and Canada; and 
airborne early-warning (AEW) aircraft for NATO. A 
total of 31 aircraft are planned for continental air 
defence and 18 for Europe; 5 will be delivered to Saudi 
Arabia (7 were scheduled for Iran in 1979-80) (53). 
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Figure C-3. An integrated tactical information system with AWACS and 
mission aircraft and ground and seaborne input and relays. 
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Figure C-3. An integrated tactical information system with AWACS and 
____ JU:ission aircraft and ground and seaborne input and relays. 
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Figure C-4. The horizon for ultra-high-frequency airborne radar 
is approximately the visible horizon. Thus at a 
radar altitude (h) of 30,000 feet, the range (R) to 
the horizon is about 245 miles. 
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Figure C-4. The horizon for ultra-high-frequency airborne radar 
is approximately the visible horizon. Thus at a 
radar altitude (h) of 30,000 feet, the range (R) to 
the horizon is about 245 miles. 
VITA 
Idris Ben-Tahir is a Canadian, who was born on 26 June 1939 in 
Hyder a bad Deccan, a landlock suzerain country, which was militarily 
occupied in 1948 by the then newly independent India. He attended 
St. George's Grammar School in Hyderabad Deccan until 1949, and 
completed his School Certificate (General Certificate of Education 1 0 1 
level) of the University of Cambridge, U.K., from St. Francis' Grammar 
School, Quetta, Pakistan in 1956-57. 
He has studied at Otterbein College, Ohio (1958-60) and is the 
only known 'alien' to have served as a member of the USAF Reserve 
Officer Training Corps. He is a graduate of the University of Ottawa, 
and has attended Queen's University, Kingston; University of {~ales 
Institute of Science and Technology, Cardiff; City of Westminster 
College, London; and Universite de la Sorbonne, Paris on various 
Canadian Forces sponsored courses. 
Ben-Tahir has served as an officer with the Royal Canadian Air 
Force (Reserves) (1963-67); and some of his appointments as a Canadian 
federal public servant since 1967, include: scientific editor with a 
research laboratory; staff officer in charge of publications and 
technical editor with the Canadian Forces Air Transport Command 
Headquarters at Trenton, Ontario; senior technical editor with the 
Aerospace Engineering Test Establishment at Cold Lake, Alberta, and 
assistant program officer with the Directorate of Air Requirements of 
the Air Doctrine and Operations Branch, National Defence Headquarters 
in Ottawa. 
He has been active with various community organizations and in 
1980 was a candidate for Member of Parliament during the 32nd general 
election for the Canadian House of Commons. 
Ben-Tahir is a bachelor and is the eldest son of the late 
Mohammed Tahir Siddiqui, Secretary of Labour and Resettlement in the 
Nizam's Government of Hyderabad Deccan (until 1948) and managing 
director of a chromite mining corporation in Baluchistan province of 
Pakistan (until 1961), and Ahmed! Begum Siddiqui, at present living in 
Karachi, Pakistan. 
207 
